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I. THE SEC'S VIEW OF SELECTIVE DISCLOSURE: THE PROBLEM AND THE SOLUTION
In the not-so-distant past, issuers of publicly held securities often would selectively
disclose material nonpublic information to analysts and other securities market insiders in
advance of any broad public announcement. Perceiving that such practices impeded a fair
marketplace to all investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission or
SEC) promulgated Regulation FD (Regulation), standing for "Fair Disclosure," which
now proscribes these practices. 1 Today, issuers of publicly held securities can no longer
* Rupert and Lillian Radford Professor of Law and Senior Associate Dean for Academics, Southern
Methodist University. Visiting Professorial Fellow, Centre for Commercial Law Studies, University of London.
** Associate, Vinson & Elkins, L.L.P.
Copyright © 2002 by Marc I. Steinberg. All rights reserved.
1. See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 43,154, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716
(Aug. 24, 2000) (Final Rule) [hereinafter Regulation FD Release].
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selectively disclose material nonpublic information to analysts, broker-dealers, other
market professionals, or favored shareholders without a corresponding announcement to
the general public.
A. Identifying the Problem
The practice of selective disclosure, as well as its effects, is illustrated in an October
1999 Washington Post article regarding Hewlett-Packard (H-P).2 The episode in question
started October 1, 1999, when H-P's CEO held a conference call with analysts at which
the executive disclosed, among other bits of information, that an earthquake in Taiwan
may disrupt the production of a component that the company used in producing personal
computers. This conference call was open to the media and H-P posted the transcript of
the call on its Internet Web site. A few weeks later, analysts called H-P to obtain more
information from the company before it went into a regular, self-imposed silence period
prior to issuing its quarterly report. H-P officials told analysts who called the company
that it was in fact experiencing a disruption. As a result, several analysts downgraded
their earnings estimates for H-P, leading to a large sell-off of stock. By the time H-P
issued a press release two days later and a formal announcement the day after that, the
company's stock price fell twelve percent. Those investors affiliated with the analysts to
whom H-P conveyed the information were able to sell off stock before the price fell, thus
protecting the value of their investment. Others, however, stood by watching their
3
investment decline without any public statement from H-P.
This incident, highlighting the practice and effects of selective disclosure, is not the
most egregious example; indeed, H-P can point to a number of practices in its defense.
First, the company had publicly disclosed the potential disruption of its flow of PC
components in its October 1 conference call. In addition, H-P did not consider the
4
distinction between may have problems and in fact having problems to be significant.
But for those investors outside the informational loop, the effect of the selected disclosure
was the same: the "'chosen few' analysts... guard[ed] the information carefully to
2. See Fred Barbash, Companies, Analysts A Little Too Cozy, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1999, at Hi. The
Commission cited this article in its release proposing Regulation FD. See Selective Disclosure and Insider
Trading, Exchange Act Release No. 42,259, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 n.18 (Dec. 20, 1999) [hereinafter
Proposed Rule Release] (citing Barbash for the proposition that analysts have increasingly based their
recommendations on information gained by having access to corporate insiders instead of undertaking
independent research). The Commission also cited a number of news stories detailing cases of selective
disclosure. Id. at 72,591-92 n.11. See Susan Pulliam, Abercrombie & Fitch Ignites Controversy Over Possible
Leak of Sluggish Sales Data, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1999, at CI; George Anders & Robert Berner, Webvan to
Delay IPO in Response to SEC Concerns, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1999, at C16; Susan Pulliam & Gary
McWilliams, Compaq Is Criticizedfor How It Disclosed PC Troubles, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1999, at Cl;
Randall Smith, Conference Calls to Big Investors Often Leave Little Guys Hung Up, WALL ST. J., June 21,
1995, at C1.
3. See Barbash, supra note 2, at HI (reporting that after the sell-off started on Tuesday afternoon, H-P
did not issue a press release regarding the earthquake-related problems until Thursday and a formal statement
until Friday morning).
4. See id. ("The analysts were informed, [H-P manager of media and financial relations Marlene] Somsak
told me, that 'we do see some disruption in component supply.' They were, in her words, 'now experiencing'
some difficulty, not just 'worrying about it.' Now, as far as the company was concerned, this was not a major
problem. Nor did the company consider it terribly important news or even new news. 'We considered it to be a
reiteration of predisclosed business conditions and risks,' she said.").
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maximize the advantage of their pre-knowledge" while the general public "frustrating[ly]
5
[sat] by in ignorance."
According to former SEC Chair Arthur Levitt, selective disclosure practices benefit
market professionals at the expense of small investors and "simply... defy the principles
of integrity and fairness." 6 Before Regulation FD, however, even though selective
disclosure of material nonpublic information may have been perceived as unfair, it
normally was not illegal. The practice of selectively disclosing such information
generally does not fall within the antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the 1934
7
Securities Exchange Act and its regulatory counterpart, Rule lOb-5. Thus, no liability
normally attaches to issuers, their executives, or market professionals for trading by the
professsionals' clients in the subject companies' securities based on material nonpublic
information.
How did the securities laws develop in such a way that permitted selective
disclosure? For many years, selective disclosure had been seen as generally falling under
early insider trading case law, thus leading to liability exposure for issuers and their
insiders who selectively tipped material nonpublic information as well as their tippees
8
who themselves tipped or traded on the information. The distinction between a tipper,
the person in the issuer company who conveyed information, and a tippee, the one who
the tippee was under the same
received the information, was seen as "untenable";
9
disclose-or-abstain obligation as an insider.
In Dirks v. SEC, 10 the Commission sought to receive Supreme Court approbation of
the SEC's approach to the tipper-tippee insider trading prohibitions unto Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5.11 To the SEC's dismay, however, the Supreme Court found that tippee
12
liability was premised on a breach of fiduciary duty by the tipper. Thus, tippee liability
5. Id. (quoting a comment posted on the online chat room http://www.ragingbull.com).
6. Michael Schroeder and Randall Smith, DisclosureRule Cleared by the SEC, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11,
2000, at Cl.
7. See Proposed Rule Release, supra note 2, at 72,593 (noting that the state of the law "afford[ed]
considerable protection to insiders who make selective disclosures to analysts, and to the analysts (and their
clients) who received selectively disclosed information"). But see SEC v. Stevens, Litigation Release No.
12,813, 48 S.E.C. Docket 739 (Mar. 19, 1991).
8. See Proposed Rule Release, supra note 2, at 72,593 (citing SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8
(2d Cir. 1977)).
9. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1974); see also
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (establishing a disclose-or-abstain rule for insiders
seeking to trade on material nonpublic information learned in the course of the job).
10. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
11. Raymond Dirks was a broker-dealer who received information regarding Equity Funding of America
(Equity Funding) from a former officer of the company, Ronald Secrist. Secrist alleged that Equity Funding
engaged in fraudulent practices that resulted in overstating the company's assets and asked Dirks to investigate
this claim. Dirks did so, but in the process also disclosed Secrist's allegations to others in the investment
community. After Equity Funding's stock price fell and a Wall Street Journal article, based on information that
Dirks uncovered in his investigation, revealed the company's fraudulent practices, Equity Funding was put into
receivership. The SEC investigated Dirks and claimed that he violated the federal securities laws' antifraud
provisions because he improperly tipped the subject information. See id. at 648-51.
12. See id. at 660 ("'[T]ippee responsibility must be related back to insider responsibility by a necessary
finding that the tippee knew the information was given to him in breach of a duty by a person having a special
relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information.' ... Tipping thus properly is viewed only as a means
of indirectly violating the Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule.") (quoting In re Investors Mgmt. Co., 44
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is derivative; if the tipper would not be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty in disclosing
the subject information, then the tippee legally may trade. The Court's test for
determining whether the tipper breached a duty was "whether the insider receives a direct
or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational
benefit that will translate into future earnings." 13 Thus, tipper-tippee liability under the
insider trading law generally extends only to tippers who receive the required personal
benefit and to tippees who knew or should have known of the breach. 14
Another significant case is United States v. O'Hagan1 5 in which the Supreme Court
embraced the misappropriation theory. This theory "holds that a person.., violates...
Rule lOb-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading
purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information." 16 Importantly,
application of the misappropriation theory is conditioned on the recipient of the
information having a duty to the source and undertaking to preserve the confidentiality of
17
the subject information.
Dirks and O'Hagancreated a gap in the securities laws that, before Regulation FD,
permitted selective disclosure. Selective disclosure of information usually stemmed from

a high-ranking official in a company or an employee whose responsibilities entailed
regularly communicating with analysts. Generally, these disclosures were made on behalf
of and for the benefit of the company; 18 they were designed to enable analysts to make
more accurate assessments of the company's performance, and even perhaps with the
objective of inducing analysts to make more favorable ones. 19 At a minimum, selective
S.E.C. 633, 651 (1971)). See also Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911 ("If... disclosure prior to effecting a
purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic under the circumstances, we believe the alternative is to
forego the transaction.").
13. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663 (emphasis added). The Court provided several examples of instances that may
give rise to a breach: if the insider's relationship with the tippee suggests a quid pro quo; when the insider
"makes a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend"; or when the insider trades on nonpublic
information and gives the proceeds to someone else. Id. at 664. See generally WILLIAM WANG & MARC I.
STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING, §§ 5.2.8.1-.8.5 (1996 & Supp. 2001).
14. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660; SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (declining to extend
liability in a situation where the insider "tipper" did not know that "tippee" overheard a private conversation). In
the tender offer context, the SEC subsequently promulgated Rule 14e-3, which generally imposed the discloseor-abstain mandate based on a parity-of-information theory to both tippers and tippees. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3
(2000). Rule 14e-3 has been upheld by the Supreme Court. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997);
infra note 52 and accompanying text.
15. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
16. Id. at 652. James O'Hagan was a partner in a law firm representing the bidder in a potential tender
offer; O'Hagan did not work on the matter himself. Based on information learned from a fellow partner in the
firm about the possible transaction, O'Hagan purchased call options and stock in the target. After the bidder
announced its tender offer publicly and the target's stock price rose, O'Hagan sold his shares and options for
more than $4.3 million in profit. See id. at 646-49.
17. Id. at 652.
18. But see SEC v. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12,813, 48 S.E.C. Docket 739 (Mar. 19, 1991)
(announcing the settlement of a case where a company's CEO and Chairman received "direct, tangible benefit
to his status as a corporate manager" after selectively disclosing information to analysts). This instance reflects
how the "personal benefit" test can be interpreted to include a benefit to one's reputation.
19. For their part, if analysts received selectively disclosed information, they may have felt compelled to
report favorably on the company that provided the information or risk not being privy to selectively disclosed
information in the future. See Proposed Rule Release, supra note 2, at 72,593 (quoting John C. Coffee, Jr., Is
Selective Disclosure Now Lawful?, N.Y. L.J., July 31, 1997, at 5).
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disclosure was a way for issuers to curry favor with analysts. 20 Nonetheless, given the
absence of any personal benefit, the Supreme Court's holding in Dirks foreclosed any
tipper liability to the insider who selectively disclosed material nonpublic information as
well as any tippee liability to the analyst who recommended trading in the company's
stock to clients. 2 1 In addition, the analyst ordinarily did not incur liability under
no obligation was owed by the analyst to the
O'Hagan'smisappropriation theory because
22
issuer to keep the information confidential.
As a result, analysts and their clients benefited from the system of selective
disclosure that developed by being able to act on material information in advance of
others. This left unaffiliated investors in the position of only being able to react to the
changes in stock prices created by the first wave of trading. In response to this situation,
the SEC sought to provide an equal playing field for all investors by promulgating
Regulation FD. The Commission attempted to structure the Regulation to balance all
investors' access to information with a narrowly crafted regulatory scheme that would not
deter issuer public disclosure of material information. 2 3 In doing so, the basic premise is
fairly straightforward. But, the Regulation leaves open many unresolved issues that
undoubtedly will need to be answered as the Commission implements the Regulation.
This Article explores key issues likely to arise under Regulation FD, including some
that the Commission may not have envisioned in promulgating the Regulation. The next
Section begins by reviewing the scope of the Regulation in the ensuing discussion. In
Part II, the Article addresses how well the Regulation fits with the policies underlying the
federal securities laws. Focusing on issues related to an issuer's duty to disclose, the
efficiency of capital markets, and the Commission's predominant emphasis on fairness in
promulgating the Regulation, the authors note that in many ways Regulation FD provides
an awkward fit with the general securities law framework. In Parts III and IV, the Article
examines more closely how this awkward fit will play out in practice as the Commission
implements the Regulation. Here, the authors highlight such issues as materiality
determinations, distinguishing between intentional and non-intentional disclosures, and
Regulation FD's interplay with Rule lOb-5. Finally, in Part IV, the authors offer some
concluding thoughts on the Regulation's future.
B. The Scope of Regulation FD
The SEC adopted Regulation FD in response to the perceived unfairness when
companies selectively disclose material nonpublic information to analysts, institutional
investors, other securities market insiders, and favored shareholders. The Regulation's
basic premise provides that an issuer, or person acting on its behalf, cannot disclose
material nonpublic information to these groups without making a corresponding public
disclosure. 24 As summarized by the SEC:
20. See Proposed Rule Release, supra note 2, at 72,592.
21. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663.
22. See O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 652.
23. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,718 ("Because any potential 'chill' is most likely to
arise-if at all-from the fear of legal liability, we included in proposed Regulation FD significant safeguards
against inappropriate liability.").
24. Id. at 51,716. The discussion in this Article setting forth Regulation FD's general parameters is
derived from the Regulation FD Release as well as MARC. I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW §
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Regulation FD (Fair Disclosure) is a new issuer disclosure rule that addresses
selective disclosure. The regulation provides that when an issuer, or person
acting on its behalf, discloses material nonpublic information to certain
enumerated persons (in general, securities market professionals and holders of
the issuer's securities who may well trade on the basis of the information), it
must make public disclosure of that information. The timing of the required
public disclosure depends on whether the selective disclosure was intentional or
non-intentional; for an intentional selective disclosure, the issuer must make
public disclosure simultaneously; for a non-intentional disclosure, the issuer
must make public disclosure promptly. Under the regulation, the required
public disclosure may be made by filing or furnishing a Form 8-K, or by
another method or combination of methods that is reasonably designed to effect
25
broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information to the public.
Regulation FD's scope focuses on those who are prohibited from selectively
disclosing material nonpublic information and those to whom the selective disclosure is
directed. The Regulation prohibits a company, or persons acting on the company's
behalf, from selectively disclosing material inside information regarding that company or
its securities. 26 For the purpose of the Regulation, an issuer includes a company that has a
class of securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act or is
27
required to file reports under Section 15 of that Act.
Regulation FD defines a "person acting on behalf of the issuer" as "any senior
official of the issuer.. . or any other officer, employee, or agent of an issuer who
regularly communicates with any [enumerated recipient of information discussed
below] .. .. or with holders of the issuer's securities." 28 This definition focuses on those
persons whose job functions regularly entail the disclosure of company-related
information to the enumerated recipients. Selective disclosure by personnel who may
occasionally interact with analysts or investors, for example, would not give rise to
liability under Regulation FD. 29 Thus, material nonpublic information disclosed in the
due course of business to customers and suppliers would be outside the scope of the
Regulation. 30 The Commission, however, has noted that, as prohibited by Section 20(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act,3 1 a senior official cannot escape liability by directing
non-covered personnel to make a selective disclosure of information to someone within
the classes of enumerated recipients. In such a case, the senior officer would be held
responsible for making the selective disclosure. 32 Finally, the definition of a "person
10.08 (3d ed. 2001).
25. Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,716.
26. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2000).
27. See id. § 243.101(b). Among other entities, the Regulation expressly excludes from the definition of
"issuer" any foreign government or foreign private issuer.
28. Id. § 243.101(c). The Regulation defines "senior official" as "any director, executive officer, investor
relations or public relations officer, or other person with similar functions." Id. § 243.101(f).
29. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,720 n.36.
30. See id.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to do any act or
thing which it would be unlawful for such person to do under the provisions of this chapter or any rule or
regulation thereunder through or by means of any other person.").
32. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,720 ("[T]o the extent that another employee had been
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acting on behalf of the issuer" specifically excludes an "officer, director, employee, or
agent of an issuer who discloses material nonpublic information in breach of a duty of
trust or confidence to an issuer." 33 In this situation, the34 issuer would not be held
responsible under Regulation FD for its employee's actions.
Regulation FD applies when material nonpublic information is selectively disclosed
to one of four enumerated classes of recipients outside the issuer: (1) a broker or dealer,
or a person associated with a broker or dealer; (2) an investment advisor, an institutional
investment manager, or a person associated with either; (3) an investment company or
affiliated person thereof; or (4) a holder of the issuer's securities, where it is reasonably
foreseeable that the holder will purchase or sell the issuer's securities based on the
35
information.
The Regulation expressly excludes, and thus does not apply to, the following: a
"person who owes a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer" 36 (e.g., temporary insiders);
37
a "person who expressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information in confidence"; a
credit rating agency, "provided the information is disclosed solely for the purpose of
38
developing a credit rating and the entity's ratings are publicly available"; and, with
certain exceptions, "in connection with a securities offering registered under the
Securities Act." 39 Furthermore, although not specifically referenced, disclosure to 40the
media or communications to government agencies are outside the Regulation's scope.
II. REGULATION FD's POLICY IMPLICATIONS

On its face, Regulation FD seems to provide a clear proscription: thou shall not
selectively disclose. With this directive, the Commission sought to plug at least a portion
of the gap-that Dirks and O'Hagan created-permitting selective disclosure. But this
rule does not cleanly fit into the federal securities laws' existing disclosure framework.
The reason for this awkward fit is this: the Commission, without expressly stating,
directed to make a selective disclosure by a member of senior management, that member of senior management
would be responsible for having made the selective disclosure.") (emphasis in original).
33. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(c) (2000).
34. See Regulation FD Release, supranote 1, at 51,720. The Commission contends "[t]he proper response
in this type of case is to hold the employee or agent responsible for illegal insider trading, not to force the issuer
to make a public disclosure due to the misconduct of one of its employees or agents." Proposed Rule Release,
supra note 2, at 72,594 n.35. Although this situation may not give rise to liability for an issuer under Regulation
FD, the issuer still may be exposed to liability under such theories as controlling person liability or respondeat
superior. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,720 n.37; see generally STEINBERG, supra note 24, §§
9.03-.04.
35. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(1)(i)-(iv).
36. Id. § 243.100(b)(2)(i). The Regulation lists attorneys, investment bankers, and accountants as
examples of those who may owe a duty of trust or confidence to the issuer. See also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S.
646, 655 n.14 (1983) ("Under certain circumstances, such as where corporate information is revealed
legitimately to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation, these outsiders
may become fiduciaries of the shareholders... [because] they have entered into a special confidential
relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and are given access to information solely for
corporate purposes.").
37. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii).
38. Id. § 243.100(b)(2)(iii).
39. Id. § 243.100(b)(2)(iv).
40. See Regulation FD Release, supranote 1, at 51,718.
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challenged a number of key principles that have shaped the disclosure frameworkprinciples that have permitted, facilitated, and perhaps even encouraged an unequal
distribution of information. In doing so, the SEC promulgated a rule that rejects or
modifies core assumptions underlying the federal securities laws.
A. Duty to Disclose Versus Parityof Information
Regulation FD highlights a key tension underlying much of the implementation of
the federal securities laws. On one hand, the underlying premise of the Securities Act of
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is full disclosure of material
information. 4 1 On the other hand, one need not disclose material information unless
under a duty to do so. 42 The federal securities law framework reflects a "bottom-up"
approach where various individual rules developed over time are aggregated into one
system. 43 Regulation FD adds another duty, under certain conditions when the issuer
elects to speak, to the list of issuer disclosure obligations where one did not exist before.
Regulation FD promotes a system of equal access to information for all investors.
Moreover, it reflects the Commission's determination that, given the impact of modem
technology (e.g., the Internet, 24-hour trading, etc.) on the rapidity of movement in stock
prices, equal access to information can be obtained only by ensuring that all participants
44
in the market are able to learn of new material information at the same time.
The concepts of parity of information and equal access to information can be found
elsewhere in the securities markets both domestically and internationally. For example,
SEC Rule 14e-3 establishes that a person possessing nonpublic material information
derived, directly or indirectly, from the bidder or the target in connection with a tender
offer must either disclose that information or abstain from trading on it.45 In addition, the
listing agreements for the national stock exchanges and National Association of
Securities Dealers Automatic Quotation (NASDAQ) System require companies to adhere
to a much greater level of continuous disclosure of material events than what issuers must
46
follow under the federal securities laws.
41. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) ("The Court has said that the
1934 Act and its companion legislative enactments embrace a fundamental purpose... to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve a high standard of
business ethics in the securities industry.") (internal quotations omitted).
42. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) ("We hold that a duty to disclose under §
10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information.").
43. See Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Requirement for
Publicly Traded Corporations: "Are We There Yet?", 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 135, 138 (1998) (contrasting the
bottom-up approach with a top-down disclosure system where a general disclosure rule is established from
which specific exceptions are carved out).
44. See infra notes 128-129 and accompanying text.
45. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2000) (providing in part: "it shall be unlawful for any person described in
paragraph (d)(2) of this rule to communicate material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer to any
other person under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such communication is likely to
result in a violation of this section"); see also STEINBERG, supra note 24, § 11.06 ("As adopted, with certain
exceptions, Rule 14e-3 applies this disclose-or-abstain provision to the possession of material information
relating to a tender offer where the persons knows or has reason to know that the information is nonpublic and
was received directly or indirectly from the offeror, the subject corporation, any of their affiliated persons, or
any person acting on behalf of either company.").
46. See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANIES MANUAL § 202.05 (2002), available at
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Furthermore, many other countries have adopted securities frameworks based on
47
either an access-to-information or parity-of-information approach. In conjunction with
these approaches, many nations with developed securities markets have established by
48
statute rigorous rules limiting insiders from tipping material nonpublic information. For
example, German law prohibits primary insiders either from trading on or tipping
material nonpublic information; in addition, the initial recipients of such information
cannot tip it to others. 49 In the United Kingdom, one who knowingly receives material
nonpublic information from an insider, either directly or indirectly, is subject to a broad
50
prohibition against trading and tipping. Furthermore, Australian law subjects any tippee
(regardless of how remote) who knowingly possesses material nonpublic information
51
In this comparative view, a specific
from trading on or tipping such information.
be necessary. The selective disclosure
not
would
FD
Regulation
to
comparable
provision
unlawful tipping in developed
constitute
would
already
information
of material nonpublic
is the logical extension of
Such
prohibited.
be
would
thus
and
abroad
securities markets
abroad.
found
approaches
parity-of-information
and
the equal-access
Despite the prevalence of the equal-access approach internationally, the United
States' duty-based federal securities law framework is generally not premised on parity of

http://domino.nyse.com/lcm.nsf ("A listed company is expected to release quickly to the public any news or
information which might reasonably be expected to materially affect the market for its securities."). The
exchanges, however, do not necessarily strictly enforce this disclosure requirement. See Oesterle, supra note 43,
at 138.
47. See MARC I. STEINBERG, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW: A CONTEMPORARY AND COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS 114-44 (1999). Foreign jurisdictions adopting the "access" doctrine include the United Kingdom;
France; Germany; Italy; Ontario, Canada; and Mexico. Australia, for example, uses the parity-of-information
approach. See id.
48. In addition to the specific countries discussed infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text, the European
Union promulgated the European Economic Community Directive Coordinating Regulation on Insider Trading.
See Council Directive 89/592, 1989 OJ. (L 344) 30. This Directive includes a provision defining a "secondary
insider" as "any person [other than a primary insider] who with full knowledge of the facts possesses insider
information, the direct or indirect source of which could not be other than a [primary insider]." Id. art. 4.
Similarly, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) set forth the goal that securities
regulation should ensure that all investors have fair access to market facilities and market or price information.
Moreover, markets should not allow some investors to hold an unfair advantage over others. See International
Organization of Securities Commission [IOSCO], Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation (Sept.
1998), at http://www.IOSCO.org/docs-public/1998-objectives.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2002) [hereinafter
IOSCO Objectives]. But cf., e.g., "Ley del Mercado de Valores" [Securities Market Law], D.O., 2 de felrero de
1975, art. 16-Bis. 1 (Mex.) (declining to impose liability on either tippers or tippees).
49. See Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [Securities Trading Law], v. 26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S.1749), § 13, 14(1)-(2)
(F.R.G.); Tony Hickinbotham & Christoph Vaupel, Germany, in INTERNATIONAL INSIDER DEALING 129, 13439 (Mark Stamp & Carson Welsh eds., 1996). France, Italy, and Japan (Securities and Exchange Law art. 166,
paras. 1, 3) have similar provisions. See Commission des Opdrations de Bourse Regulation 90-08, J.O., July 20,
1998, p. 8602, D.S.L., 345, arts. 2-5 (Fr.); Ordinance No. 67-833, J.O., Sept. 28, 1967, p. 9589, D.S.L., 373, art.
10-1 (Fr.); Law No. 58 of Feb. 24, 1998, Gazz. Uff. No. 71, Mar. 26, 1998, art. 180, paras. 1, 2 (Fr.);
Shokentorihikiho [Securities and Exchange Law], Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 166, paras. 1, 3 (Japan); see also
STEINBERG, supranote 47, at 114-44.
50. See Criminal Justice Act, 1993, §§ 52, 57 (Eng.); see also Tim Herrington & Jason Glover, The United
Kingdom, in INSIDER TRADING IN WESTERN EUROPE: CURRENT STATUS 33, 43 (Gerhard Wegen & HeinzDieter Assmann eds., 1994).
51. See Corporations Law, 1970, § 1002G (Austl.).
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or equal access to information. 52 In Chiarella v. United States,53 the Supreme Court
specifically rejected the notion "that the federal securities laws have created a system
providing equal access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent investment
decisions." 54 Sellers, purchasers, and market intermediaries are under no duty to disclose
material inside information unless they are specifically obliged to do so; absent such a
requirement, participants in the securities markets have no general affirmative duty to
55

disclose material information.
Regulation FD seeks to mesh an equal-access/parity-of-information rule into the
duty-based disclosure framework. 5 6 To comport with the rest of the underlying disclosure

framework, the Regulation establishes a specific duty for an issuer-to speak publicly if
and when its representatives speak at all. This specific duty, however, is a broad-based
one owed to all actual and potential participants in the market for that company's
securities. Few rules in the securities regulatory system provide such a wide range of
beneficiaries to a duty to disclose. Because it creates a specific duty with a broad scope,
Regulation FD fits awkwardly within the securities law framework.
B. The RelationshipBetween Disclosureand Market Efficiency
A well-established principle of securities regulation is that a capital market should
be efficient. 5 7 The efficient market theory holds that a market is efficient when it "rapidly

reflects new information in price." 5 8 An appropriate question, therefore, is to what extent
does Regulation FD promote and/or hinder market efficiency. To help answer this
question, we turn to a previously developed theory by Professors Ronald J. Gilson and

Reinier H. Kraakman regarding market efficiency. 59

52. Exceptions to this general rule do exist. See, e.g., United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 666-77
(1997) (determining that in promulgating Rule 14e-3 the Commission properly exercised its rulemaking
authority); United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 556-64 (2d Cir. 1991) (portion of opinion affirming
Chestman's conviction based on Rule 14e-3); supra note 45 and accompanying text (regarding Rule 14e-3).
53. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
54. Id. at 232 (internal quotations of appellate court decision omitted).
55. See, e.g., Staffin v. Greenberg, 672 F.2d 1196, 1202 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[Olne who purchases stock on
the open market who is neither an insider nor a fiduciary... need not disclose the reasons for his purchase,
even if the purchase is based on the knowledge of material facts.").
56. For another discussion of Regulation FD's balance between the market-efficiency and equal-access-toinformation approaches, see Robert J. Conner, Regulation FD: Its Creation,Its Authority, Its Possible Impact,
28 SEC. REG. L.J. 233, 235-45 (2001).
57. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-47 (adopting the fraud-on-the-market theory, in
part, "[b]ecause most publicly available information is reflected in [a stock's] market price"); Preliminary
Response of the Commission to the Recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure,
Securities Act Release No. 5,906, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,505, at 80,048 (Feb. 15,
1978) ("The basic objective of the disclosure requirements is to increase investor confidence and to make the
securities markets more efficient and as fair and honest as possible.") (emphasis added) [hereinafter Release No.
5,096]; IOSCO Objectives, supra note 48 (stating as an objective "to ensure that markets are fair, efficient and
transparent"); Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market
Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 615 n.3 (1988) (citing examples of congressional
statements in favor of promoting market efficiency).
58. 4 ALAN BROMBERG & LEWIs D. LowENFELs, SECuRITiEs FRAUD AND COMMODITIES FRAUD § 8.6
(1994 & Supp. 1999).
59. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv.
549 (1984).
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Gilson and Kraakman note that even in an efficient market where stock prices
rapidly reflect new information, the speed at which the prices absorb the information will
60
vary based on the mechanisms by which the information is disclosed. Thus, various
forms of disclosure will have different "relative efficiencies"; some forms of disclosure
61
Gilson and
will result in new equilibrium pricing more efficiently than others.
the most
from
ranging
mechanisms,
Kraakman set forth a continuum of disclosure
efficient to the least:
Universally Informed Trading: where all participants in the securities6 2 market
"
receive the information at the same time and without significant costs.
Professionally Informed Trading: where "a minority of knowledgeable traders
*
who control a critical volume of trading" develop or receive information 63and
whose trading signals to the marketplace the existence of new information.
Derivatively Informed Trading: where nonpublic information is leaked through
*
such mechanisms as insider trading, misappropriation, or inadvertent
64
disclosure.
Uninformed Trading: where no trader of a company's stock possesses
•
price reflects traders' aggregate
nonpublic information, but where that stock's
65
information.
available
on
based
forecasts
Regulation FD's goal is to achieve the first tier of disclosure-universally informed
trading. The selective disclosure practices that the Regulation proscribes fall within the
second category-professionally informed trading.
One can make an argument that selective disclosure provides a relatively efficient
means of improving the overall quality of information in the marketplace and that the
66
Regulation eliminates this benefit. Regulation FD's critics contend that it will chill
disclosure. 6 7 Assume for the moment that these critics are correct, or that, at a minimum,
60. See id. at 559 ("[D]ifferent market mechanisms may be responsible for the reflection in price of
differentially available categories of information").
61. Gilson and Kraakman write:
The operational definition of market efficiency tightly restricts the speed of the market's
response to new information by requiring prices to reflect such information "always"-i.e., very
promptly. It is a short step from this emphasis on the rapidity of price response to a definition of
"relative efficiency." The market, and the mechanisms that operate to reflect new information in
price, are more or less efficient depending on how quickly they yield efficient equilibrium prices;
relative efficiency is a measure of the speed with which new information is reflected in price.
Id. at 560 (footnotes omitted).
62. Id. at 568.
63. Id. at 569-70 (noting that the rapidity by which a stock price responds to the professionally informed
trading depends on the volume of such trading).
64. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 59, at 572-73.
65. See id. at 579-81.
66. Similar arguments have been made about insider trading. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 256-57 (1991); Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 868 (1983); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider
Trading: Rule l0b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 811 (1980). Gilson and
Kraakman contend that insider trading represents a relatively inefficient means of disclosure. Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 59, at 629-34. By comparison, according to their theory, selective disclosure would be a
more efficient means of disclosure than insider trading. Id. at 631-32.
67. Press Release, Securities Industry Association, SEC Attempt to Cast More Light on Corporate
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Regulation FD will significantly delay an issuer's public release of material information
(particularly if it is bad news). Under this scenario, Regulation FD would (at least
temporarily) force all investors into the lowest tier of disclosure-uninformed trading,
where no trader would possess the applicable material nonpublic information. If selective
disclosure were allowed, however, issuers would be more receptive to leak information
into the marketplace. As recipients of the information commence trading on the
selectively disclosed information, that would signal to others in the marketplace that the
current stock price does not reflect all material information. Moreover, according to the
critics, the gradual movement toward an equilibrium price accurately reflecting all
material information is preferable to the spasmodic shocks that accompany the public
disclosure required under Regulation FD. 68
Under the efficient market theory, the information available in the marketplace and a
company's stock price are connected. With selective disclosure placing information into
the marketplace at a time when it might otherwise not be, that information will become
absorbed into the stock price. The question is the pace at which the information becomes
absorbed. The argument above presumably envisions a fairly quick rate of absorptionthat selective disclosure is in fact a relatively efficient mechanism of disclosure. 69
By promulgating Regulation FD, the Commission seems to have called this
assumption into question or viewed it as secondary to facilitating investor fairness. 70
Although the assumption of rapid absorption is useful for economic-theory based
arguments, it may not comport with the realities of securities trading. For selectively
disclosed information to be absorbed into the marketplace, recipients first must act on it.
Such recipients will be ahead of the curve in terms of the gradual movement in the stock
price toward equilibrium. As Gilson and Kraakman note, "the relative efficiency of
market mechanisms determines the magnitude of arbitrage opportunities that new
information creates for the fortunate traders who 'know' it first."'7 1 Regulation FD posits
that the relative inefficiency of selective disclosure and the arbitrage opportunities that
result from such practices are significant enough to threaten the integrity of the securities
markets.
If the Commission is correct in this regard, then Regulation FD is an effective way
to minimize the adverse impact of selective disclosure practices. But, if the Commission
has underestimated the rapidity of information flows and overestimated the extent of
Finances May Trigger 'Information Blackout,' Leaving Investors in the Dark (Aug. 10, 2000), available at
http://www.sia.com/press/html.pr-corpfin.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2002) [hereinafter Information Blackout].
68. Cf Gerri Willis, Stocks You've Always Wanted at Prices You Won't Believe, SMART MONEY, Dec. 1,
2000, at 150, 152 ("In the past, most companies would manage investor expectations by quietly letting a few
analysts in on the change instead of blaring the news through the foghorn of a public release. [Regulation FD]
makes nasty public warnings the only way out.").
69. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 59, at 572 (contending that professionally informed trading
results in a rapid assimilation of the information into the stock price).
70. See Proposed Rule Release, supra note 2, at 72,592 n.15 (citing an empirical study of trading in
companies' stock after conference calls with analysts in which the authors conclude that certain investors are
given the opportunity to trade on material information disclosed during the calls before that information is
disseminated fully to the public); cf. John C. Coffee Jr., Is Selective Disclosure Now Lawful?, N.Y. L.J., July
31, 1997, at 5 (evaluating the similarities and differences of insider trading's and selective disclosure's
respective effects on market efficiency).
71. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 59, at 560.
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arbitrage opportunities, 72 then the Regulation may serve as an unwarranted burden on the
infusion of quality information into the marketplace. The issue of Regulation FD's effect
on the relative efficiency of disclosure-that is, how fast information flows into the
marketplace and is absorbed into a company's stock price under the Regulation's
framework-is one that the Commission will need to continually assess.
With Regulation FD, the Commission has expressed its clear preference for the toptier disclosure of material information; selective disclosure of material information is too
inefficient and unfair to allow this mechanism to be used in the securities markets. But
selective disclosure is not the only form of second-tier disclosure. Indeed, the basic job of
an analyst is to sift through a wealth of public information to identify arbitrage
opportunities for their clients. 73 Such information becomes meaningful to most investors
74
only when analysts, employing what is called the mosaic approach, piece together
relevant disparate public information into a comprehensive analysis. This refining
disclosed by issuers, drives a significant
approach, in addition to the raw information
75
portion of trading in the capital markets.
Examining Regulation FD solely from a market efficiency standpoint sends an
inconsistent message. Selective disclosure practices and an analyst's ferreting-ofinformation function may be fairly equivalent efficient mechanisms of disclosure.
Moreover, selective disclosure normally should be a more efficient means in that analysts
procure new information in a less costly manner. Nevertheless, Regulation FD prohibits
these practices, while permitting and even encouraging a theoretically equally efficient
76
means of disseminating information pursuant to the mosaic approach. Clearly, as
discussed next, the Commission took into account other factors than just market
efficiency in promulgating Regulation FD. Considered from this specific perspective,
however, the Commission has left open the question of the Regulation's own efficiency
by challenging the assumptions underlying the efficiency of selective disclosure.
C. BalancingNotions of Fairnessand Investor Confidence With Other Goals
The federal securities regulatory framework incorporates a number of goals and
principles, including those discussed in the two preceding Sections. It also strives to
77
promote fairness and investor confidence in the system. These goals and principles
72. See id. at 571-72 (contending that even though market professionals will be able to trade at an
informational advantage over other investors before the stock price reaches an equilibrium, their long-term
returns will not be significantly greater than the market average).
73. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983) ("It is commonplace for analysts to ferret out and
analyze information, and this often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others who
are insiders. And information that the analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the market
worth of a corporation's securities." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
74. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,721.
75. Cf Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658-59 (discussing the importance of analysts in preserving a healthy market);
Information Blackout, supra note 67 (discussing the Regulation's potential effect on "the ability of securities
firms to guide their client's investment decisions").
76. See Proposed Rule Release, supra note 2, at 72,592 (indicating that the SEC recognizes the benefits
that accrue to the securities markets from analysts who ferret out information).
77. See Release No. 5,096, supra note 57, at 80,047 (parenthetical quotation); cf. IOSCO Objectives,
supra note 48 (identifying the three core objects of securities regulation as: to protect investors; to ensure that
markets are fair, efficient and transparent; and to reduce systemic risk).
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sometimes coalesce but other times conflict. Perhaps surprisingly, rules promoting the
efficiency of the marketplace at times do so at the expense of other goals. 7 8 As noted
above, the Commission sought to promote more than just market efficiency by
promulgating Regulation FD; it expressly sought to enhance fairness and investor
79
confidence in the integrity of the nation's capital markets.
In the abstract, one may assert that selective disclosure in and of itself is not
necessarily a bad thing. If information were selectively disclosed among all participants
in the marketplace on a random basis, that theoretically could offer some efficiency and
benefits to the securities markets. A fundamental problem with selective disclosure
practices in the past has been that it imposed structural biases into the marketplace. 80
The first bias separated market professionals from non-professional investors and
clearly favored the former. One class of investors-those affiliated with analysts and
other market intermediaries who received nonpublic information--consistently were able
to take advantage of the arbitrage opportunities arising from selective disclosure, while

other investors were not permitted to share in these benefits. 81
The second bias stemmed from the fact, or at least the perception, that issuers doled
out information like a commodity to those analysts who had or would report favorably on
the company. 82 Such a narrowed mechanism of dissemination presumably reduced the
relative efficiency of selective disclosure as a means by which stock prices would absorb
material information. For selective disclosure to be an efficient mechanism of
dissemination, the few parties who receive the information must control, either directly or
indirectly, a sufficient volume of trading in order for the stock price to reflect rapidly any
selectively disclosed information. If only a relatively small number of analysts are privy
to selectively disclosed information, as would be the case when selectively disclosed
information is treated like a precious commodity, then a fundamental component of
selective disclosure is lacking for it to be considered an efficient mechanism. 83
These biases affected the competitiveness of the marketplace. Market insiders with
access to selectively disclosed information and individual investors who did not hold
such a privileged position were facing different market structures, with insiders ahead of
the information curve and individuals behind it. Moreover, the biases became
systematized, thereby restructuring the rules of the investing game to downplay skill in

78. See Stout, supra note 57, at 616 ("In each case, legal rules that favor efficient stock markets do so by
sacrificing other regulatory goals."); id. at n.10 ("Allowing insiders to trade on the basis of information
unavailable to public investors violates notions of fairness.... Program trading erodes investor
confidence....").
79. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,716 ("Where [selective disclosure] happened, those
who were privy to the information beforehand were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those
kept in the dark. We believe that the practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence in the
integrity of our capital markets.").
80. See Proposed Rule Release, supra note 2, at 72,591 ("In practice, issuers also retain control over the
audience and forum for some important disclosures.").
81. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,716.
82. See id. at n.7. ("Regulation FD is also designed to address another threat to the integrity of our
markets: the potential for corporate management to treat material information as a commodity to be used to gain
or maintain favor with particular analysts or investors.").
83. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 59, at 569 (noting that efficient professionally informed trading
requires a sufficient amount of traders who "control a critical volume of trading").
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analyzing information, or even blind luck, in favor of having the right connection with
any given issuer. 84 The Supreme Court previously has noted that "it is hard to imagine
that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who would
85
disclosure practices, as they
knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?" Selective 86
game.
crap
crooked
a
of
equivalent
the
in
developed, resulted
The Commission thus sought to eliminate this perceived "stacked deck" by
87
prohibiting selective disclosure practices. That in itself is an admirable goal, but it does
come with consequences. By placing emphasis predominantly on fairness and investor
confidence, the Commission uprooted the balance between these objectives and others,
such as market efficiency and disclosing information only when under a duty to do so. In
doing this, the Commission wedged Regulation FD awkwardly into the existing
disclosure framework.
FROM REGULATION FD's Focus ON THE INTENTIONAL AND NONINTENTIONAL DISCLOSURE OF MATERIAL NONPUBLIC INFORMATION

III. ISSUES STEMMING

It is important to note that this Article makes no qualitative judgments regarding
Regulation FD. It is far too early to do so, at least until more empirical information is
available regarding its implementation and effect. But, it is not too early to identify what
likely will become problem areas stemming from the Regulation's awkward fit into the
existing disclosure framework. With this in mind, this Article next explores the problems
that the Commission will face in implementing Regulation FD.
A. Materialityand the IntentionalNon-IntentionalDistinction
Although one could explore the hidden issues of Regulation FD along several lines,
this Article focuses on the most important ones. In this regard, issues that will emerge as
fundamental, or at least become more prevalent as the SEC implements Regulation FD,
are those relating to the Regulation's focus on materiality and the distinction between
intentional and non-intentional disclosures. Because these terms are somewhat imprecise
by their nature, the primary issues to arise will likely be associated with determining what
standards are used to measure the materiality of selectively disclosed information and
whether a subject disclosure was intentional.
1. Meaning of "Material"and "Nonpublic"
Although the Regulation refers to "material" and "nonpublic" information, it does
not define those terms. Instead, the SEC relies on case law to provide definitions. Thus,
"[i]nformation is material if 'there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable

84. See Proposed Rule Release, supranote 2, at 72,592.
85. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246-47 (1987) (quoting Schlanger v. Four-Phase Sys., Inc., 555
F. Supp. 535, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)).
86. See Proposed Rule Release, supra note 2, at 72,592 (discussing the Commission's concern regarding
the effect that selective disclosure has on market integrity).
87. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,716 ("Investors who see a security's price change
dramatically and only later are given access to the information responsible for that move rightly question
whether they are on a level playing field with market insiders.").
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shareholder would consider it important in making an investment decision... [and it is] a
fact [that] 'would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the 'total mix' of information made available.' 88 Information is nonpublic "if it
has not been disseminated in a manner making [such information] available to investors
89
generally."
The Supreme Court has long rejected any bright-line test for assessing materiality. 90
As a result, the law surrounding the definition of materiality is an ever-changing one,
often changing in subtle ways that make materiality determinations difficult. One recent
development is the pronounced rejection of a quantitative threshold as the sole means for
assessing materiality. 9 1 Issuers and their auditors often would use such a threshold, such
as five percent, for making materiality determinations; for example, if a misstatement in a
financial statement resulted in a four percent overstatement of net income, issuers would
not consider the misstatement to be material. 92 The SEC staff, in Staff Accounting
Bulletin 99 (SAB 99), contends that such a "rule of thumb," while useful as an initial
step, is not dispositive of the misstatement's materiality. 93
Despite the fact that the staff did not intend SAB 99 to "provide definitive guidance
for assessing 'materiality' in other contexts," 94 courts are likely to use it as persuasive
authority. One such example is the Second Circuit's decision in Ganino v. Citizens Utils.
Co. 95 The court, drawing from SAB 99,96 declined to find a misstatement amounting to
1.7% of total revenue to be immaterial as a matter of law simply because it involved such
a small percentage. 97 Based on these recent expositions on materiality, if a piece of
financial data varies only a small percentage from original estimates but has a significant
impact, the conclusion that the change is immaterial likely will be strongly contested. 9 8

88. Id. at 51,721 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)). The Regulation
FD Release also cites SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (Aug. 12, 1999) [hereinafter SAB
99] as authority supporting its definition of "materiality."
89. Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,721 (citing SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 854
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
90. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 236 ("Any approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always
determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding such as materiality, must necessarily be overinclusive or
underinclusive.").
91. See, e.g., Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2000) ("[W]e have consistently
rejected a formulaic approach to assessing the materiality of an alleged misrepresentation."); SAB 99, supra
note 88, at 45,151 ('The staff reminds registrants and the auditors of their financial statements that exclusive
reliance on... any percentage or numerical threshold [for making materiality determinations] has no basis in
the accounting literature or the law.").
92. See SAB 99, supra note 88, at 45,151.
93. Id.
94. Id. at n.1.
95. 228 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2000).
96. Id. at 163 ("SAB No. 99 is thoroughly reasoned and consistent with existing law-its non-exhaustive
list of factors is simply an application of the well-established Basic analysis to misrepresentations of financial
results-we find it persuasive guidance for evaluating the materiality of an alleged misrepresentation.").
97. Id. at 161-64.
98. Examples of small percentage changes that have significant impact are addressed infra notes 115-116
and accompanying text. The Ganino court lists several cases where courts rejected a formulaic approach: Press
v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 534-37 (2d Cir. 1999) (declining to establish a specific range beyond
which a markup would be "excessive"); Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 156 (2d Cir. 1992) (materiality
in the context of merger negotiations depends on specific facts); In re Home Health Corp. of Am., Inc. Sec.
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Given the difficulty in making materiality determinations, the Commission offered
in the Regulation FD Release several examples of information that likely would require
issuers to make a materiality determination: "(1) earnings information; (2) mergers,
acquisitions, tender offers, joint ventures, or changes in assets; (3) new products or
discoveries, or developments regarding customers or suppliers; (4) changes in control or
in management; (5) change in auditors; (6) events regarding the issuer's securities; and
99
(7) bankruptcies or receiverships."
In addition, SAB 99 offers a non-exhaustive list of qualitative "considerations that
10 0
Among these
may well render material a quantitatively small misstatement."
considerations are: "whether the misstatement masks a change in earnings or other
trends"; "whether the misstatement hides a failure to meet analysts' consensus
expectations for the enterprise"; "whether the misstatement changes a loss into income or
vice versa"; and "whether the misstatement concerns a segment or other portion of the
registrant's business that has been identified as playing a significant role in the
registrant's operations or profitability."' 10 1 The Regulation FD Release and SAB 99 thus
provide issuers with some guidance with respect to making materiality determinations in
order to comply with Regulation FD. But with any piece of information, the key for a
materiality determination is on what significance a reasonable investor would place on
the information. Thus, materiality determinations remain elusive and subject to scrutiny
with the gloss of hindsight.
2. Intentionaland Non-Intentional Selective Disclosure
Another important issue under Regulation FD involves whether the issuer
selectively disclosed the information intentionally or non-intentionally. This assessment
determines when the issuer must make the information publicly available. If the issuer
intentionally and selectively discloses material nonpublic information, then it must
disclose the same information simultaneously to the public. 10 2 If the selective disclosure
is non-intentional, the issuer must disclose the information promptly, which is defined:
as soon as reasonably practicable (but in no event after the later of 24 hours or
the commencement of the next day's trading on the New York Stock
Exchange) after a senior official of the issuer ...learns that there has been a
non-intentional disclosure by the issuer or person acting on behalf of the issuer
knows, or is reckless 10 3 in not knowing,
of information that the senior official
1 4
is both material and non-public. 0
Litig., No. Civ. A. 98-834, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1230, at *6-*7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1999) (holding that a de
minimis loss was not immaterial where a qualitative factor caused the loss to be significant); In re Kidder
Peabody Sec. Litig., 10 F. Supp. 2d 398, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (declining to find that misstatements affecting
profits by 2.54% were immaterial). But see SEC v. Hoover, 903 F. Supp. 1135, 1146 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (finding
that withholding information regarding a zero to two percent decrease in year-end estimated earnings was not
material as a matter of law).
99. Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,721. The SEC, however, chose not to establish bright-line
tests for such information in part because it is not material per se.
100. SAB 99, supra note 88, at 45,152.
101.

Id.

102. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(1) (2000).
103. By "reckless" the Commission means:
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The standard for determining whether a selective disclosure is "intentional" meshes
with the Regulation's definitions of materiality and nonpublic. The Regulation defines
"intentional" to be that "the person making the disclosure either knows, or is reckless in
not knowing, that the information he or she is communicating is both material and
nonpublic."' 105 Thus, if an issuer were merely negligent in erroneously judging whether a
certain piece of selectively disclosed information is either material or nonpublic,
Regulation FD would not impose liability. By using this standard, the Commission seeks
to provide "additional protection that issuers need not fear being second-guessed by the
Commission in enforcement actions for mistaken judgments about materiality in close
cases."' 1 6 Nonetheless, the SEC warned that the determination of materiality should take
into account all facts and circumstances. Thus, for example, a materiality judgment that
might not be reckless in the context of an impromptu answer to an unexpected question at
a press conference may be reckless in the context of a prepared written statement where
the issuer has more time to evaluate the information it is about to disclose. 107
Furthermore, if an issuer displays a pattern of "mistaken" judgments regarding
materiality, that company's credibility would be harmed when it comes to future claims
that any particular disclosure was not intentional. 108
B. Issues To Be Resolved
1. MaterialityDeterminations
An issuer can selectively disclose information in various manners. For example, it
can prepare a formal statement that is released in advance to selected analysts; an officer
can leak information to gauge how the marketplace may respond, much like the way a
politician floats a trial balloon; or a spokesperson can let information slip in response to
an unexpected question. In each context, the issuer or person speaking on its behalf is
required under Regulation FD to make a materiality judgment about the information. But
the level of information at that person's immediate disposal and the time in which that
determination must be made varies widely. In the first two examples, the issuer likely
will have sufficient time to consider its decision and consult with counsel in advance. In
the third context, in response to a question, the spokesperson does not necessarily have
that benefit.

a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence,
but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor
must have been aware of it.
Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991); see
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977);
see also Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,722 (citing Hollingerand Sunstrandfor the proposition that
"in view of the definition of recklessness that is prevalent in the federal courts..
104. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d) (2000).
105. Id. § 243.101(a) (emphasis added).
106. Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,722 (stating that "in the case of a selective disclosure
attributable to a mistaken determination of materiality, liability will arise only if no reasonable person under the
circumstances would have made the same determination").
107. See id.
108. See id. at n.57.
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The Commission recognizes that, under Regulation FD, people speaking on behalf
of the company often will be required to make fast judgments as to the materiality of
information. SEC General Counsel David Becker reflected that such materiality
determinations will be easy to second-guess in hindsight, but that "[t]he SEC understands
that people sometimes must make a real-time decision as to whether information is
material." 10 9 Stephen Cutler, Deputy Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement,
perhaps seeking to provide some comfort to issuers and their executives, remarked that
1 10
Similarly, SEC
the Commission is "not looking for hides to tack up on the shed door."
materiality
a
mistaken
that
opined
Enforcement Division Director Richard H. Walker
care in
reasonable
of
standards
from
judgment "must represent an extreme departure
1 11
FD."
Regulation
of
violation
a
allege
to
order for the [enforcement] division
Despite this rhetoric of assurance, the language of Regulation FD itself does not
provide much flexibility specifically in regard to making materiality determinations.
Even though issuers will be required to make predictions on whether any piece of
information is material, the real test will be in hindsight when the SEC initiates an
enforcement action against an issuer for a Regulation FD violation. In that regard, a piece
of information ultimately will be deemed to be material or immaterial regardless of the
manner in which it was selectively disclosed. The materiality standard will be applied in
the same way regardless of whether an alleged violator has had several weeks to decide
whether to selectively disclose certain information or is one who attempts to make a good
faith spur-of-the-moment materiality determination but does so erroneously.
The primary protection that the Regulation offers to issuers for mistaken materiality
judgments lies in the distinction between intentional and non-intentional disclosures (this
distinction will be examined more fully in the ensuing discussion; for now we will focus
on the implications that it has for assessing materiality determinations). For a disclosure
to be deemed intentional, the issuer must know, or be reckless in not knowing, that the
information was material; mistaken good-faith materiality determinations likely will not
be considered "intentional." 112 The Commission has assured that it will take into account
all the facts and circumstances regarding the materiality determination, thus allowing for
relaxing the Regulation's application to an issuer who makes an erroneous spur-of-themoment materiality determination. The distinction of being found to have made a nonintentional disclosure buys the issuer time to make a corresponding public disclosure
without incurring liability under Regulation FD. If the issuer believes, however, that the
information is not material, then additional time would not be necessary. Under such
circumstances, the issuer would not feel compelled to disclose the information publicly
because it already had made its materiality determination. Nonetheless, if the information
in hindsight were deemed material and the issuer recklessly made this determination, then
the issuer would violate the Regulation because it failed to make a prompt public
109. SEC Staff Explains Scope of New DisclosureRules, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1942, at 4 (Sept. 25,
2000) [hereinafter Staff Explains].
110. Id.
111. Enforcement Director Walker Comments on Regulation FD, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1949, at 3
(Nov. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Walker Comments]; see also William C. Smith, Tell-All Rules, 87 A.B.A. J. 60, 63
(2001) (discussing Enforcement Director Walker's statement).
112. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,722 ("[lIt is unlikely that issuers engaged in good-faith
efforts to comply with the regulation will be considered to have acted recklessly.").
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announcement following a senior official learning of the inadvertent selective
disclosure. 113
The issue, therefore, is at what point an issuer responding to an unanticipated
question, for example, must make a materiality determination. The answer apparently is
that, even though the language of the Regulation does not expressly provide, the issuer
must make not one, but two, such determinations. The issuer must make the first
determination at the time the question is posed and the spokesperson decides to
answer; 114 the second must come shortly afterward so that if the issuer concludes that the
information is material, it can publicly and timely disseminate the information in order to
satisfy Regulation FD.
Let us next examine how these interpretive issues may play out. Consider, for
example, the situation regarding Hewlett-Packard discussed at the beginning of this
Article. There, the company apparently did not consider the distinction between a
possible disruption in its component supply, which it previously publicly disclosed, and
the actual disruption that in fact transpired to be material. Let us add some facts to create
a new scenario involving a hypothetical issuer, Acme Co. Suppose that the actual
disruption in Acme's supply of components occurs late in the fiscal quarter and causes
revenue to be 0.9% less than originally projected. Further suppose that at the end of a
conference call unrelated to the component supply, Anna List, an analyst for a Wall
Street investment firm, asks Ima Mouthpiece, the company's manager of media and
financial relations, about the effect a potential disruption in supply might have on the
company's revenues. Mouthpiece thinks for a moment and responds, "Well, we are
actually experiencing a disruption in supply, but its impact on revenues is small-less
than 1% for the quarter."
This is the type of spur-of-the-moment response that likely would be considered to
be a non-intentional selective disclosure. Mouthpiece made a good faith, but hurried,
materiality determination regarding both pieces of information (the actual disruption and
the impact on revenues) and concluded that neither was material. If company officials
abide by or concur with this determination, they will not feel compelled to issue a public
announcement; in their view, Regulation FD would not apply because the information
was immaterial. But the Commission may, after the fact, conclude that this information
was material. If this happens, the company may be deemed to have violated the
Regulation.
113. See 17 C.F.R. § 243. 100(a)(2) (2000). One question to consider is whether the issuer must be at least
reckless in making its materiality determination in order to violate Regulation FD. In the Regulation FD release,
the SEC opined: "Neither will we, nor could we, bring enforcement actions under Regulation FD for mistaken
materiality determinations that were not reckless." Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,718. Moreover,
SEC Enforcement Director Walker contends that an issuer must undertake an extreme departure of reasonable
care in making an incorrect materiality determination in order to have violated Regulation FD. See supra note
111 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the language of the Regulation itself, however, does not necessarily
support this proposition. As noted in the text, the mens rea associated with materiality determinations is used to
distinguish between intentional and non-intentional disclosure. Thus, under a strict reading of the Regulation, if
an issuer negligently and erroneously determined that information was not material, it could still violate
Regulation FD for failing to conform to the Regulation's disclosure requirements for non-intentional
disclosures. See generally infra Part II.B.2.
114. Of course, the spokesperson could respond "no comment" as a way to avoid making a selective
disclosure, but doing so in itself may raise other issues, as discussed infra Part IV.A.
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This scenario highlights the difficulty in making materiality determinations,
particularly at the spur of the moment. The distinction between a highly possible
disruption and an actual disruption coming to fruition is a narrow one that the typical
investor may or may not find material. But the active sell-off of stock in the real-life
Hewlett-Packard situation following the disclosure of the actual disruption would seem to
indicate that analysts and their firms' clients considered the new information to be
material. 1 15 In hindsight, H-P's assessment of the importance of this information appears
incorrect.
The disclosure regarding the impact on revenue presents a further problem for
spokespersons fielding on-the-spot questions. The only information that Ima Mouthpiece
may have had readily available likely was quantitative-e.g., the less than one percent
impact. She may not have readily possessed or been told of certain qualitative factors that
might affect the materiality determination regarding this information. For example,
Mouthpiece may not have known what impact the disruption in supply would have if
extrapolated over a full quarter, as opposed to occurring only late in the fiscal period. The
Commission likely will look to such qualitative factors when making its materiality
determination regardless of what information the spokesperson had at the time of the
non-intentional disclosure. This scenario thus highlights the point made above-that
cautious issuers should undertake a second materiality determination following any spurof-the-moment discussion between personnel and market professionals covered by
Regulation FD.
Another related issue is how strictly the SEC will enforce the Regulation when it
comes to materiality determinations. The above discussion has shown the tough issues
that companies face with respect to materiality determinations, particularly as the law of
materiality evolves. 116 The Commission is well within its authority to treat issuers who
make good-faith, but erroneous, materiality determinations with some leniency. But, as
noted above, the Commission's current rhetoric of flexibility is not derived specifically
from the Regulation itself; it reflects more of the current interpretation that the
Commission has decided to give the Regulation. Thus, the Commission could decide to
enforce the Regulation more stringently in the future. In the Regulation FD Release, the
115. Cf. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that the fact that
institutional investors did not sell stock after learning a piece of information serves as evidence of that
information's immateriality); SEC v. Hoover, 903 F. Supp. 1135, 1146-47 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (discussing "market

reaction as a measure of materiality"). Market reaction to information, however, at best merely represents
evidence of materiality; the standard remains focused on the importance that a reasonable investor would place
on the information in making an investment decision. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
By comparison, internationally the concepts of materiality and market price are tied together by
statute. See, e.g., Securities Act, R.S.O., § 1(1) (1990) (Ont., Can.) (defining a material fact as a "fact that
significantly affects or would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of
securities"); "Ley del Mercado de Valores" [Securities Market Law], D.O., 2 de febrero de 1975, art. 16-Bis.
(Mex.); Criminal Justice Act, 1993, § 60(4) (Eng.); Commission des Opdrations de Bourse Regulation 90-08,
J.O., July 20, 1998, p. 8602, D.S.L. 345, art. I (Fr.) (privileged information is "any precise non-public
information ... which, if made public, might affect the price of the security"); Wertpapierhandelsgesetz
[Securities Trading Law], v. 26.7.1994 (BGBI. I S. 1749), § 13 (F.R.G.); Law No. 58 of Feb. 24, 1998, Gazz.
Uff. No. 71, March 26, 1998, art. 180, para. 3 (Italy); Corporations Law, 1970, § 1002(G)(1) (Austl.) (regarding
information that, if it were generally available, "might have a material effect on the price or value of

securities").
116. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text.
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SEC laid the groundwork for more stringent enforcement against issuers who make
repeated erroneous materiality determinations. 117 In addition, Enforcement Director
Walker has noted that the staff will target two types of violations: "intentional or reckless
disclosure of information that is unquestionably material ...[and] those who deliberately
attempt to 'game the system."' 118 Certainly, the Commission could decide to view
materiality determinations with an even more critical eye if it believes that it needs to do
so to make the Regulation more meaningful.
2. DistinguishingBetween Intentional and Non-IntentionalDisclosure
As noted above, Regulation FD's distinction between intentional and non-intentional
disclosures serves a formal function of determining when an issuer must make a public
disclosure following a selective disclosure of material nonpublic information. 119 It also
serves an informal function of providing the Commission some flexibility in
implementing the Regulation. Although the Regulation attempts to demarcate the line
between the two, that line likely will be quite blurry as the SEC begins to enforce the
Regulation. The question to consider, therefore, is how the Regulation's differentiation
between intentional and non-intentional disclosure will play out in practice, or more
specifically, what standards will the Commission use in distinguishing intentional from
non-intentional disclosures.
In theory, almost any selective disclosure of information could be deemed
intentional. Even the spur-of-the-moment type of disclosure discussed above envisions
the spokesperson making a calculated assessment of whether the information is material
and nonpublic and whether to answer the question posed. Furthermore, because the
Regulation's definition of "intentional" includes a standard of recklessness, 120 the
spokesperson may be assumed to have certain knowledge that he or she does not actually
have at the time of disclosure. Thus, the Commission conceivably could argue in every
case that the selective disclosure was intentional and required simultaneous public
12 1
disclosure.
Although the merits of this argument may vary from case to case, it provides the
Commission with a strong negotiating tool to induce a settlement from an alleged
violator. Specifically, the SEC staff could propose a settlement in which the issuer would
consent to Commission findings of a non-intentional disclosure violation, but threaten to
pursue an intentional disclosure breach if the issuer does not accept the offer. Issuers
might be willing to accept such a settlement as a means to limit the sanctions they
receive, such as a reduced monetary penalty, and to control the adverse publicity and

117. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1,at 51,722 n.57.
118. Walker Comments, supra note 11,at 4. One "games the system" by "speaking in code, or stepping
over the line again and again, thus diminishing the credibility of a claim that their disclosures were nonintentional." Id.
119. See supra Part II.A.2.
120. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(a) (2000).
121. Cf. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating, in a Rule 10b-5 case,
that "[o]ne who deliberately tips information which he knows to be material and nonpublic to an outsider who
may reasonably be expected to use it to his advantage" is considered to have satisfied the "knowing" standard
for scienter).
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legal costs associated with defending against the claim. 122 The in terrorem benefit that
the SEC will receive by the blurry line between intentional and non-intentional
emphasizes the policy decision that the Commission will make in enforcing the
Regulation. Although the Commission's current position appears to be more lenient to
issuers who truly make a non-intentional disclosure, just how the SEC enforcement staff
implements the Regulation remains to be seen.
One situation that may arise occurs when an issuer makes a good-faith attempt to
disclose information publicly, perhaps in connection with an intentional disclosure in a
closed meeting with analysts, but does not do so in a way that satisfies the Regulation's
requirement of being "reasonably designed to provide broad, non-exclusionary
distribution of the information to the public." 123 For example, suppose an issuer that
trades on the NASDAQ Small Cap Market submits a press release to major business wire
services believing that the services will carry the release, but the issuer has been reckless
in not knowing that the services will not do so. 124 The Regulation FD Release notes that
if an issuer knows that its press releases are not carried by the major wire services, the
release may not be sufficient to satisfy the public disclosure requirement;1 25 and the SEC
equates recklessness with knowing misconduct. Therefore, the SEC could assert that the
press release in this hypothetical example failed to satisfy Regulation FD's definition of
public disclosure. As a result, the disclosure to the analysts that prompted the press
release effectively will remain "selective" and thus violate the Regulation. Thus, what
started as a good-faith attempt to satisfy Regulation FD would be deemed violative.
Given the Commission's rhetoric exhibited in the Regulation FD Release, the SEC
would not necessarily pursue enforcement in this seemingly anomalous situation. The
Regulation FD Release ostensibly provides issuers with a good deal of discretion in
making public disclosures, stating that the Regulation does not establish a "'one size fits
all' standard for disclosure ... [and] leaves the decision to the issuer to choose methods
that are reasonably calculated" to result in an effective public disclosure. 12 6 The Release
cautions, however, that the Commission will examine "all the relevant facts and
circumstances,"' 127 thus leaving the SEC and its staff latitude in how stringently the
Regulation's language will be enforced.
Another implementation issue that will arise stemming from the intentional/nonintentional distinction is how rigorously the Commission will enforce the timing of
public disclosure. The Commission already seems to have established a very hard-line
interpretation of the Regulation's requirement for a "simultaneous" public disclosure to
be made in conjunction with an intentional selective disclosure. This issue arose during a
conference call in which SEC staff discussed issues related to the Regulation:
If an impermissible disclosure is made late in the day, and the disclosure
seemed intentional, a press release that is issued well before the market opens
122. See generally MARC I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND
STATE ENFORCEMENT (2d ed. 2001).

123. 17 C.F.R. 243.101(e)(2) (2000).
124. This could happen if, for example, the major business wire services have reported on one or more
press releases issued by the company, but those were the exceptions as opposed to the norm.
125. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,724.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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the following day would not be considered "simultaneous," said [Deputy
Director Stephen] Cutler. With after-hours trading and 24-hour trading
becoming more prevalent, he stated that "simultaneous
means
1 28
simultaneous."
The Commission's concern about after-hours and 24-hour trading is warranted as news
stories often report incidences in which stock prices rose or fell dramatically in such
129
trading following an announcement released after normal business hours.
The question thus arises whether the Commission will take a similar approach in
determining whether a public release following a non-intentional disclosure is sufficiently
"prompt" to satisfy the Regulation. The Regulation's definition of "promptly" has
significant room for interpretation. For example, the definition begins by stating that
"'[p]romptly' means as soon as reasonably practicable." 130 If "simultaneous means
simultaneous," then presumably "as soon as" means "as soon as." Cautious issuers should
not be misled by the parenthetical conditional language in the Regulation's definition of
"promptly"-specifically, "[but in no event after] the later of 24 hours or the
commencement of the next day's trading on the New York Stock Exchange." 131 This
language may represent the absolute latest time at which an issuer must make a public
announcement after learning of a non-intentional disclosure. Given the Commission's
concern regarding after-hours trading, the Regulation's 24-hour language presumably
does not provide a regulatory safe harbor. Because parties with information could be
trading on that information at any time, issuers would be well advised to act with the
utmost urgency in releasing information or else risk liability under Regulation FD.
In this regard, a dispute over whether an issuer made a public disclosure promptly
could come down to a matter of hours (theoretically, even minutes). Consider the
impromptu-question scenario discussed in the previous section involving Acme Co.
where Ima Mouthpiece selectively disclosed the existence of an actual delay in supply
and its impact on revenues. Suppose that, this time, immediately after making a nonintentional disclosure of material nonpublic information in response to Anna List's
128. See Staff Explains, supra note 109, at 4.
129. See, e.g., Lee Gomes & Don Clark, Oracle Issues Profit Warning As Sales Slow, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2,
2001, at A3 (stock price fell over 21% in heavy volume of after-hours trading following an announcement made
after 4 p.m.); 3Com Lowers Targets for Latest Quarter,Cites Industry Turmoil, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2001, at
B 10 (stock price fell 13% in after-hours trading following an announcement made after regular trading hours);
David P. Hamilton, Sun Says Profit May Be Half of Forecasts, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 23, 2001, at A3 (stock price
fell 9.3% in after-hours trading following a warning of lower-than-expected profits); VA Linux's Net Loss
Widened in 2nd Period, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2001, at B8 (stock price fell 22.4% in after-hours trading
following a disclosure made after the markets closed at 4 p.m.); Mark Heinzl, Nortel Is Hit By Downturn in
Telecom, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2001, at A3 (stock price fell 23% in after-hours trading, reducing Nortel's
capitalization by more than $20 billion and representing a new 52-week low price).
130. 17 C.F.R. § 243.101(d) (2000).
131. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1,at 51,723. As with other interpretive issues, Regulation FD
does not clearly indicate whether this parenthetical language is a stand-alone provision or works in conjunction
with the rest of the definition of "promptly." In other words, when does this provision's clock start runningwhen the non-intentional disclosure is made, or when a senior official learns or was reckless in not learning
about it? The Regulation FD Release suggests the latter: "Thus, if a non-intentional selective disclosure of
material, nonpublic information is discovered after the close of trading on Friday, for example, the outer
boundary for making public disclosure is the beginning of trading on the New York Stock Exchange on
Monday." Id. at 51,723 (emphasis added). See infra note 138.
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question, Mouthpiece realizes that the information is material and that the company must
publicly disclose the information. Senior officials at Acme draft an appropriate press
release in the matter of an hour, but are unable to get the company president, who is
traveling or otherwise unavailable, to sign off on the release. Even though the senior
officials who drafted the release have the authority to issue it, they normally do not do so
without the president's approval. As a result, they wait another three hours to issue the
press release until they are able to communicate with the president.
In this scenario, a strict interpretation of Regulation FD would require Acme to issue
the release when it was first drafted and reviewed by authorized personnel, one hour after
the non-intentional selective disclosure. The fact that the company followed its normal
procedures for issuing a press release (i.e., obtaining the president's approval) may not be
relevant to a determination of when Acme should have released the information "as soon
as reasonably practicable." Furthermore, the fact that the company issued the release well
within twenty-four hours of learning of the disclosure may be irrelevant because it still
did not issue the release "as soon as reasonably practicable." This scenario is just but one
possibility used to highlight the differing interpretations of "reasonably practicable." The
conclusion that one can draw is that issuers may not be able to delay for any reason, even
legitimate business ones, in making a public disclosure following a non-intentional
selective disclosure.
Another aspect of the Regulation's definition of "promptly" that merits attention is
that the clock for measuring if a disclosure was made "as soon as reasonably practicable"
starts to run "after a senior official of the issuer... learns that there has been a nonintentional disclosure. . ., or is reckless in not knowing." 132 The term "learns"-both by
its own meaning and in contrast to the phrase "reckless in not knowing"-means actual
knowledge. In many cases a senior official likely will have actual knowledge of a nonintentional disclosure within a fairly short time of it being made because either a senior
official will have made the disclosure or the covered person acting on behalf of the issuer
will have reported the disclosure to a senior official soon afterwards.
Let us consider this latter scenario more closely: Suppose a non-senior official
acting on behalf of the issuer who is covered under the Regulation makes a nonintentional disclosure. The issuer incurs the risk that the non-senior official might not
inform a senior official of the disclosure in a timely manner. For example, the person
might not believe the information was material and thus not feel compelled to inform her
supervisor of the disclosure. Or, if the covered person does recognize the materiality of
the disclosed information, he may seek to avoid being reprimanded for making the
disclosure and thus hide or lie about the disclosure in hopes that the issue will go away.
Finally, busy work schedules may prevent the spokesperson from being able to debrief a
senior official.
Regardless of the reason, an indeterminate period of time-a few hours, a few days,
a few weeks-may pass before a senior official actually learns of the disclosure.
Assuming that the issuer's securities are traded in an efficient market (where selective
disclosure represents a relatively efficient mechanism of dissemination) 133 and that the
recipients of the disclosed information trade on it, the market will have absorbed the
132. 17 C.F.R. 243.101(d) (2000).
133. See supra Part I.B.
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disclosed information before the issuer arguably would be required to make the public
disclosure under Regulation FD. 134 During that time, industry insiders and professionals
likely will be able to respond to changing circumstances faster than individual investors
and, as a result, take better advantage of arbitrage opportunities associated with the
information.
Under this scenario, even if the issuer eventually makes a public disclosure promptly
following a senior official's actual knowledge of the non-intentional disclosure, the
Commission may seek to attach Regulation FD liability presumably based on the issuer
being reckless in not knowing of the non-intentional disclosure. Effectively the
Commission would be saying to the subject issuer, "Your failure to learn of the
disclosure represented an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care. You
should have instituted reasonably effective compliance procedures that would have
enabled you to act sooner, thereby providing the small investor the same opportunity to
respond that the institutional investors had." 135 Several issues arise, however, if liability
is to attach based on a senior official's recklessness in not knowing.
First, because the Regulation creates liability exposure to the issuer based on a
senior official's recklessness, how will the Commission determine the time at which a
senior official should have had knowledge? This issue may be particularly important in
circumstances where the time frame between the non-intentional disclosure and the
eventual public disclosure is relatively lengthy. Neither Regulation FD nor Commission
releases provide any specific guidance. Absent such guidance, the determination
seemingly would be within the discretion of the Commission and its staff.
A second related issue stems from the Commission's position that "in view of the
definition of recklessness that is prevalent in the federal courts, it is unlikely that issuers
engaged in good-faith efforts to comply with the regulation will be considered to have
acted recklessly." 136 This language may effectively require issuers to establish a formal
reporting system to ensure that non-senior officials covered by the Regulation inform a
senior official of any statements made to the specific recipients of information listed in
Regulation FD. Adhering to such a reporting system presumably would satisfy the need
to make a good-faith effort to comply with the Regulation. But it also crystallizes two
instances in which liability under the reckless standard could be met: situations where the
reporting system is not followed and instances where a company does not maintain such a
formal system. 137 In both cases, the Commission's argument that the issuer's actions
134. See infra notes 135-138 and accompanying text. Cf Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988)
("With the presence of a market, the market is interposed between seller and buyer and, ideally, transmits
information to the investor in the processed form of a market price.... The market is acting as the unpaid agent
of the investor, informing him that given all the information available to it, the value of the stock is worth the
market price.") (emphasis added).
135. With respect to the adoption and implementation of a reasonably effective reporting system, see infra
notes 137, 140 and accompanying text.
136. Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,722. For the definition of "reckless," see supra note 103.
137. As an analogy for an issuer's duty to ensure proper report systems, consider a broker-dealer's duty to
supervise its employees. Cf, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2000) (Exchange Act § 15(b)(4)(E)) (establishing
both a duty to supervise persons under a broker-dealer's supervision to prevent them from violating the
securities laws and a safe harbor when procedures are designed and followed to prevent such a violation); In re
Prudential-Bache Secs., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 22,755, [1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
83,948 (1986) ("The responsibility of broker-dealers to supervise their employees by means of
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138
would have a
represented an "extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care"
greater likelihood of success.

C. Implementing Regulation FD

As noted above, the Commission and its staff enjoy significant discretion in
implementing Regulation FD. The language of the Regulation itself and the
Commission's formal releases are sufficiently vague to allow either relatively relaxed
enforcement or more stringent implementation. Even SEC Commissioner Laura S. Unger
has advanced the idea that the Commission and139staff need to clarify the practices that
would likely receive the Commission's attention.
The problem with such vagueness is that commercial certainty reigns for issuers that
seek to comply with the Regulation. To preserve the integrity of Regulation FD, the SEC
should heed Commissioner Unger's call for more definitive guidance on key ambiguous
issues such as those highlighted above. Law-observant issuers and their executives should
not have to rely only on informal assurances from SEC officials that they are "not
looking for hides to tack up"; they should receive better guideposts from the Commission
in advance.
Until such guidance becomes available, however, issuers will be faced with the
prospect of how best to comply with Regulation FD. Cautious issuers probably should
pay little regard to the assurances offered by SEC representatives. Instead, they may wish
to assume that the Commission and its staff will implement the Regulation more

effective, established procedures is a critical component in the federal investor protection scheme regulating the
securities markets."). Present applications of compliance programs in the corporation securities law context
include those directed against illegal insider trading. See WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 13, § 13.6.
138. Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977). Note, moreover, that the SEC in
the Regulation FD release may have implied that issuers who make the requisite disclosure within the confines
of the "24-hour requirement" will not be subject to liability. The Commission stated:
We believe that it is preferable for issuers and the investing public that there be a clear
delineation of when "prompt" disclosure is required. We also believe that the 24-hour
requirement strikes the appropriate balance between achieving broad, non-exclusionary
disclosure and permitting issuers time to determine how to respond after learning of the nonintentional selective disclosure. However, recognizing that sometimes non-intentional selective
disclosures will arise close to or over a weekend or holiday, we have slightly modified the final
rule to state that the outer boundary for prompt disclosure is the later of 24 hours or the
commencement of the next day's trading on the New York Stock Exchange, after a senior
official learns of the disclosure and knows (or is reckless in not knowing) that the information
disclosed was material and nonpublic. Thus, if a non-intentional selective disclosure of material,
nonpublic information is discovered after the close of trading on Friday, for example, the outer
boundary for making public disclosure is the beginning of trading on the New York Stock
Exchange on Monday.
Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,722-23.
139. Unger Explains Reg FD Vote, Vows to Monitor Rule Effects, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1950, at 4-5
(Nov. 15, 2000) (calling for the Commission and staff to "provide more guidance regarding the practices that
are of concern to the Commission and those that are not") [hereinafter Unger Explains]. Unger "voted against
the adoption of Regulation FD and pledged to monitor the regulation for its effectiveness." Id. at 4; cf Smith,
supra note 111, at 61 (questioning what effect the eventual appointment of the successor to former Commission
Chair Levitt will have on Regulation FD).

The Journalof CorporationLaw

[Winter

stringently, either now or in the future. Thus, they should implement sufficient processes
to protect against Regulation FD liability. Such processes, as noted above, would include
reviewing after-the-fact any information disclosed following an on-the-spot decision that
the information was immaterial and implementing a formal reporting system between
140
non-senior officials covered by the Regulation and an appropriate senior official.

IV. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN REGULATION FD AND RULE 1OB-5
The Commission structured Regulation FD to impose a distinct duty, the failure of
which is not supposed to give rise to liability under the federal securities laws' antifraud
provisions. The Regulation states "No failure to make a public disclosure [under the
Regulation] ...shall be deemed to be a violation of Rule l0b-5." 14 1 Even though a
Regulation FD violation does not constitute fraud per se, the Regulation may not be as
142
independent of Rule lOb-5 as the Regulation's language implies.
A. Relationship Between Regulation FD and Rule 10b-5
In certain circumstances, an issuer may have certain affirmative disclosure
obligations, 143 such as a duty to respond to rumors144 or a duty to update previous
140. Compare this process with a broker-dealer's duty to supervise, discussed supra note 137. See 15
U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1)(A)-(B) (Exchange Act § 21A) (establishing liability for a controlling person who knows or
is reckless in not knowing that a controlled person engaged in illegal insider trading or tipping, or failed to
establish, maintain, or enforce procedures designed to prevent such activity).
141. 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2000) (section heading "No effect on antifraud liability").
142. The discussion in the text focuses on potential liability that issuers may face in regard to Regulation
FD and/or Rule lOb-5. The Regulation, however, also interacts with new Rule 10b5-2 and the misappropriation
theory to expose recipients of information selectively disclosed under a confidentiality agreement to potential
Rule lOb-5 liability. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2000). With Regulation FD, the Commission seeks to stem
the unfairness associated with selective disclosure in two ways: by preventing issuers from selectively
disclosing material nonpublic information in the first place and by burdening the recipients of any such
information that is selectively disclosed with an obligation that such recipients hold the information in
confidence. For this latter approach to be meaningful, the Commission will need to prosecute any recipients
who trade on such information under the securities laws' antifraud provisions, basing liability on the
misappropriation theory and the recipient's breach of a duty owed to the issuer. See generally United States v.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 649-59 (1997); see also supranotes 15-17 and accompanying text.
Prior to Regulation FD, the issue of whether a confidentiality agreement gave rise to the duty
necessary to pursue a misappropriation claim was not a given. Under certain state law contract principles,
"merely reposing confidential information in and of itself will not create a fiduciary relationship." Trumpet
Vine Invs., N.V. v. Union Capital Partners I, Inc., 92 F.3d 1110, 1117 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (applying New York
state law); see also United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating, in a case involving
information shared between a husband and his wife, "[r]eposing confidential information in another, then, does
not by itself create a fiduciary relationship" for Rule l0b-5 criminal liability); Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,
623 F.2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying Delaware law to reject the claim that an investment banker "became
a fiduciary... by virtue of the receipt of confidential information"). The Commission's new Rule 10b5-2 closes
this issue by basing antifraud liability on "material nonpublic information misappropriated in breach of a duty
of trust or confidence"; it goes on to define "duty of trust or confidence" to include "whenever a person agrees
to maintain information in confidence." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2000).
143. See generally Oesterle, supra note 43; Marc I. Steinberg & Robin M. Goldman, Issuer Affirmative
Disclosure Obligations-An Analytical Frameworkfor Merger Negotiations, Soft Information, and Bad News,
46 MD. L. REv. 923 (1987); Dennis J. Block et al., Affirmative Duty to Disclose Material Information
Concerning Issuer's FinancialCondition and Business Plans, 40 Bus. LAW. 1243 (1985).
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statements. 14 5 As the illustration below shows, if an issuer finds itself in a situation
where it has such a duty, simultaneous obligations arise under Regulation FD and Rule
46
lOb-5.1
Perhaps this issue is best discussed in the context of earnings guidance, a topic that
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Consider the following scenario building on the hypothetical involving Acme Co.
Assume now that neither Ima Mouthpiece nor anyone else at Acme has yet disclosed that
the company is in fact experiencing a component supply disruption (i.e., the most recent
public disclosure was that the company "may" face a disruption). Anna List, trying to
ferret out additional information about the company, calls Huck Ster, a mid-level sales
150
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144. Issuers may have a related duty to disclose material information when rumors in the marketplace are
attributable to them. See State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981) ("A company
has no duty to correct or verify rumors in the marketplace unless those rumors can be attributed to the
company.").
145. See In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) (imposing "a duty to disclose
arises whenever secret information renders prior public statements materially misleading"); Backman v.
Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("[Iln special circumstances, a statement, correct at
the time, may have a forward intent and connotation upon which parties may be expected to rely.... [if] there
is a change, correction... further disclosure, may be called for."). But cf San Leandro Emergency Med. Plan v.
Philip Morris Cos., 75 F.3d 801, 810 (2d Cir. 1996) ("We believe that Time Warner went nearly to the outer
limit of the line that separates disclosable plans from plans that need not be disclosed.").
146. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,726 (discussing possible connections between
Regulation FD and bases for establishing Rule lOb-5 liability).
147. See id. at 51,721 ("One common situation that raises special concerns about selective disclosure has
been the practice of securities analysts seeking 'guidance' from issuers regarding earnings forecasts.").
148. See Walker Comments, supra note 111, at 4 (asserting that materiality of earnings guidance generates
the greatest attention with respect to inquiries of companies regarding what they can say in this setting).
149. Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,721. But see Conner, supra note 56, at 265 n.177 (SEC
General Counsel Harvey Goldschmidt contending that in most cases the selective disclosure to an analyst that
estimated revenues would remain unchanged would "be okay as long as it is just a reaffirmation of public
knowledge").
150. Such a relationship usually will not arise in the normal course of business between the issuer and
analysts. But such relationships could arise, for example, if the analyst and the mid-level manager have some
form of significant social relationship outside of their professional lives. Or perhaps the issuer and analyst may
have met at a professional conference, and the analyst keeps the manager's contact information as a source to
turn to for information about the company.
151. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,720 ("Mhe regulation will cover senior management,
investor relations professionals, and others who regularly interact with securities market professionals or
security holders.").
152. Because Regulation FD does not cover the mid-level manager, if she discloses this information on her
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other information that Anna has obtained, she concludes that Acme will not meet its
earnings estimates for the quarter and advises her clients to sell the company's stock. As
this information quickly spreads around Wall Street, other analysts start putting calls into
the issuer seeking guidance about its earnings estimates. In addition, a shareholder
watching CNBC learns of the rumor and calls the investor relations manager at the issuer
to ask if it is true. How should Acme respond?
In this scenario, Acme faces dilemmas between Rule lOb-5, Regulation FD, and its
business interests. Assume that the company's previous public statements regarding its
earnings estimates continue to be "alive" in the marketplace and that subsequent eventsnamely, the disruption in component supply-have rendered those statements materially
misleading. In this situation, Acme may have a duty to update the earnings estimates or
potentially face Rule lOb-5 liability. 153 Any selective disclosure of this information,
however, will violate Regulation FD, so the company cannot simply respond to
individual inquiries made by analysts and investors. On top of all this, Acme rightfully
may be concerned that if and when the information becomes public, investors will
overreact and sell off their stock in the company, thus leading to a rapid decline in the
stock price. 154 The best alternative to Acme's problem may well be to announce revised
earnings estimates to preclude any Rule lOb-5 liability and to do so with a public
disclosure designed to satisfy Regulation FD. Although Acme faces adverse financial
repercussions once the information becomes public, this consequence would have
occurred in any event (but perhaps not as precipitously) regardless of the timing of
disclosure. At least by making the disclosure up front, the company can foreclose any
liability under the securities laws and frame the revised estimates in the best possible
light (while still conveying them truthfully).
What if Acme decides, however, not to disclose updated earnings estimates? Given
that the duty to update may arise only in special and limited circumstances, 155 company
own accord (i.e., without direction from someone covered by the Regulation), such disclosure would not
constitute a prohibited selective disclosure under the Regulation. See id. For example, "if an analyst sought to
ferret out information about an issuer's business by quizzing a store manager on how business was going, the
store manager's response ordinarily would not trigger any Regulation FD obligations." Id. at n.56. Also assume
for the sake of this analysis, the sales manager does not derive any personal benefit from this disclosure, thus
foreclosing any Rule lOb-5 tipper/tippee liability under Dirks. See supra notes 10-14, 18-21 and accompanying
text.
153. See Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1990). In addition to facing potential Rule lOb-5
liability if it fails to update earnings, under the scenario crafted, the issuer also might face such liability for
failing to respond to a rumor ultimately attributable to such issuer. But the case for Rule lOb-5 liability probably
would be harder to make based on the issuer failing to respond to a rumor. The only information that was
attributable to the issuer was that orders were not being filled; no source within the issuer stated that the
company would not meet earnings estimates. Because of this, the discussion in the text focuses on the issuer's
duty to update.
154. See Willis, supra note 68, at 152 (examining the relationship between companies that issued warnings
and a fall in their stock price). Willis contends that in some cases investors overreacted to warnings by selling
off their stock and that the resulting decline in some companies' stock prices created opportunities for other
investors to pick up "bargain stocks." Id.
155. See Backman, 910 F.2d at 17 (quotation cited supra note 145). In construing the Backman decision,
one commentator has argued:
For the first time, a court's careful analysis in a specific factual context makes completely clear
that the duty to update is not nearly as broad as some of the authorities seem to suggest. The duty
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officials may believe that Acme would not face any Rule lOb-5 liability if it did not
update earnings estimates. Under this scenario, the best approach may be simply to
respond "no comment." 156 Such a response is "generally [considered] the functional
equivalent of silence"; 157 a "no comment" response does not convey, at least in theory,
any information about the earnings forecast and thus comports with Regulation FD. In
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information about positive changes in earnings estimates. The issuer should develop a
"no comment" policy in regard to isolated inquiries on matters such as earnings forecasts
regardless of what the revised earnings estimates would show and consistently adhere to
doing
that policy. If an issuer uses "no comment" merely as a means to signal bad news, 160
proscribes.
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Regulation
that
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and
"wink
of
kind
the
be
to
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is not triggered simply because a prior statement would no longer be true if repeated at a later
date in the light of intervening facts. [The court] did not articulate in detail precisely when an
updating duty would exist, but the brief discussion suggests that the duty would arise primarily in
special circumstances.
Carl Schneider, The Uncertain Duty to Update-Polaroid11 Brings a Welcome Limitation, 4 INSIGHTS, No. 10,
2, 10 (1992).
156. See In re Carnation Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 83,801, at 87,596 n.6
(1985) ("[Aln issuer that wants to prevent premature disclosure of nonpublic preliminary merger negotiations
can, in appropriate circumstances, give a 'no comment' response to press inquiries concerning rumors or
unusual market activity."). Although the standards regarding "no comment" statements principally have been
developed in the context of preliminary merger negotiations, presumably these standards also apply to issuers
responding to rumors in the marketplace generally. See id.; Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17
(1988).
157. Cf. Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 n.17.
158. Cf, e.g., In re MCI Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 93 F. Supp. 2d 276, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Had MCI
replied 'no comment' to questions about the merger, and said nothing more, the Complaint would not state a
cause of action for securities fraud. However, MCI said more than 'no comment."').
159. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 n.17 ("It has been suggested that given current market practices, a 'no
comment' statement is tantamount to an admission that merger discussions are underway.... That may well
hold true to the extent that issuers adopt a policy of truthfully denying merger rumors when no discussions are
underway, and of issuing 'no comment' statements when they are in the midst of negotiations." (internal
citation omitted)); cf. SEC v. Moran, 922 F. Supp. 867, 894-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (under the circumstances
involved, a "no comment" statement would have signaled information); Burstein v. Applied Extrusion Tech.,
Inc., 150 F.R.D. 433, 448 (D. Mass. 1993) (distinguishing between "no comment" as a neutral statement and
"no news" as an affirmative statement).
160. To reiterate an important point, however, the issuer cannot blindly rely on the "no comment" statement
to delay disclosing information in all circumstances. When the issuer has an affirmative duty to update or to
respond to rumors, its silence-even if in the form of a "no comment" statement-could be construed as a
material omission and thus serve as the basis for Rule lOb-5 liability. See Carnation, [1984-1985 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at n.6 ("[A] 'no comment' response would not be appropriate where, inter alia,
the issuer has made a statement that has been rendered materially false or misleading as a result of subsequent
events or market rumors are attributable to leaks from the issuer."). See generally Jason B. Myers, An Issuer's
Duty to Disclose: Assessing the Liability Standardsfor Material Omissions, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. (forthcoming
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Regulation FD's critics contend that it will chill the flow of information into the
securities markets, 16 1 while the Commission counters that the practicalities of the
securities markets will induce issuers to continue to disclose material information. 162
Based on the discussion above, both sides may be correct. In regard to isolated calls by
favored analysts seeking to ferret out updated information or to confirm a rumor, whereas
company spokespersons previously may have leaked such information, Regulation FD
dissuades issuers from giving selective guidance to securities professionals. But when
analysts start issuing their own warnings about the company's earnings or unconfirmed
information becomes widespread, the issuer likely will feel pressure to address these
issues to stave off fears that might be building in the securities marketplace. Such
disclosure also would foreclose any antifraud liability for failing to respond to the
issuer's duty to update or to respond to a rumor.
During the time commencing when the unconfirmed information first enters the
marketplace (e.g., when the first analyst issues a warning) until the company publicly
responds, Regulation FD's effect is to shift the capital market for the company's stock
from professionally informed trading stemming from the selective disclosure of the
material information that existed in the pre-Regulation FD era to uninformed trading that
may prevail today. In other words, the Regulation moves the market toward a less
efficient mechanism of disclosure. 163 But once the issuer announces information
publicly, the Regulation moves the market into the most efficient disclosure
mechanism-universal trading. 164 One key element in assessing Regulation FD's
effectiveness, therefore, will be determining what effect the pre-public disclosure period
will have on the securities markets and issuers.

2002).
The textual analysis regarding the interplay between Regulation FD and Rule 10b-5 also can be
applied to issues involving state law corporate fiduciary duties owed by directors to shareholders. Under
Delaware law, for example, directors owe a duty of candor that requires a board to "disclose all material facts
when seeking stockholder action." Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998) (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606
A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992)). Because shareholders are covered recipients under Regulation FD, any material
nonpublic information submitted to them also must be disclosed publicly. Issuers thus may have difficulty
avoiding public disclosure without being subject to at least some form of liability exposure, either under
Regulation FD for selective disclosure or for failing to adhere to the duty of candor. Thus, for companies
planning to engage in a transaction that requires shareholder action, the company needs to be prepared to
disclose publicly all material facts of the transaction at the same time it discloses that information to the
shareholders, even if it otherwise would prefer not to do so. The duty of candor under Delaware law does
provide some restrictions that may limit what information needs to be disclosed. See id. at 21 (balancing the
shareholders' need for candor with the company's need to keep "certain financial information confidential").
Delaware law requires that only a statutory minimum amount of information be disclosed to shareholders. See
id. at 15 (noting that Delaware's General Corporation Law does "not require the directors to convey substantive
information beyond a statutory minimum"). See generally Mark Klock, Litigating Securities FraudAs A Breach
of FiduciaryDuty in Delaware, 28 SEC. REG. L.J. 296 (2001).
161. See, e.g., Information Blackout, supra note 67.
162. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,718 (referencing comments received in connection
with the Proposed Rule Release, supra note 2). The Commission also contends that Regulation FD's scope has
been sufficiently narrowed to address the potential "chilling effect" on issuer disclosures. See id.
163. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 59, at 579 (noting that uninformed trading represents the least
efficient disclosure mechanism on the authors' continuum).
164. See supranotes 60-72 and accompanying text.

2002]

The Hidden Issues of the SEC's Regulation FD
B. Congruence Between Regulation FD and Rule 10b-5

The interplay between Regulation FD and Rule lOb-5 may converge and present
greater liability risk for an issuer. As addressed above, violating the Regulation does not
itself give rise to antifraud liability under Rule lOb-5. Nor does the violation of
16 5
Nonetheless, an issuer's failure to
Regulation FD give rise to a private right of action.
comply with Regulation FD may serve as evidence of an antifraud violation.
For example, consider one of the toughest elements of an antifraud claim based on a
167
166
the Supreme
In Chiarella v. United States,
material omission: the duty to speak.
Court noted "[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no
168
One difficulty for plaintiffs in litigating such a claim is
fraud absent a duty to speak."'
establishing the issuer's duty to speak. In fact, outside the stock-offering context, courts
often reflect the view that issuers have no general affirmative duty to disclose material
170
One
information, 169 unless, as noted above, the issuer is under a specific duty to do so.
is to disclose information when the
specific duty with which an issuer must comply
17 1
SEC's rules and regulations require it to do so.
172
commentators expressed
After the Commission first proposed Regulation FD,
concern that the Regulation would constitute such a rule and, thus, provide a basis on
which private plaintiffs could establish the required element of breach of duty to
disclose. 173 In response, the Commission added Rule 102,174 which "expressly provides
that no failure to make a public disclosure required solely by Regulation FD shall be
175
Thus, an issuer's violation of Regulation FD
deemed to be a violation of Rule l0b-5."
in itself will not give rise to a private lawsuit.
With the word "solely," however, the SEC recognized that Regulation FD's
language would not preclude private lawsuits related to a selective disclosure if they were
based on other grounds, such as tipping and insider trading when the Dirks "personal
176
the issuer's failure to meet its duty to update or duty to correct,
benefit" test is met;
165. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,726 (stating that the Regulation "is not designed to
create new duties under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws or in private rights of action").
166. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22,
27 (1st Cir. 1987) (stating that "the prevailing view ... is that there is no such affirmative duty of disclosure"
absent insider trading; a statute or regulation requiring disclosure; or an inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading
prior disclosure); cf Cooperman v. Individual, Inc., 171 F.3d 43, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1999) (examining when
Section 11 of the Securities Act imposes a "specific obligation" to disclose material nonpublic information). But
see Issen v. GSC Enters., 538 F. Supp. 745, 751-52 (N.D. I11.1982) (offering a widely rejected view that
imposed civil liability on an issuer for omitting material facts from its annual report even though the issuer was
under no other duty to disclose the information).
167. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
168. Id. at 235.
169. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
170. Such specific duties include the duties to update and to respond to rumors, as discussed supra Part
W.A.
171. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 227-30.
172. See generally Proposed Rule Release, supra note 2.
173. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,726 (commentators suggesting that proposed
Regulation FD "offered insufficient protection from private lawsuits").
174. 17 C.F.R. § 243.102 (2000).
175. Regulation FD Release, supra note 1,at 51,726.
176. See id. (citing SEC v. Stevens, Litigation Release No. 12,813, 48 S.E.C. Docket 739 (Mar. 19, 1991).
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when applicable; 177 or entanglement or adoption theories related to an issuer's
interactions with analysts. 178 As a result, a private litigant may be able to use a
Regulation FD violation as evidence that one of the duties above did exist.
For example, assume an issuer provides material updated earnings estimates to an
analyst without making a corresponding public disclosure. Not only would that violate
Regulation FD, but a private litigant could argue that the selective disclosure represented
the issuer's tacit admission that the company's earnings estimates still alive in the
marketplace were incorrect and needed to be updated. Thus, this would be evidence that
the issuer had a duty to update.
Similarly, although Regulation FD does not provide a private right of action, 179 its
application will assist in proving other elements necessary for establishing an antifraud
claim in government and private suits. For example, both Rule lOb-5 and the Regulation
require that the information involved be material. 180 Because Regulation FD relies on the
definition of materiality developed in Rule lOb-5 litigation, 18 1 by establishing liability
under Regulation FD, the Commission will have already provided evidence that the
subject information in fact was material. 18 2 In addition, if an issuer is found to have
selectively disclosed material nonpublic information intentionally, that should ordinarily
provide conclusive evidence of the company's scienter required as part of a Rule lOb-5
claim. 183
Let us consider how these factors would come together, again returning to the
hypothetical involving Acme Co. In this scenario, assume that Anna List calls Ima
Mouthpiece after the market closed on a Tuesday afternoon to get updated information on
the potential impact of the possible supply disruption. Mouthpiece replies, "We've been
getting so many calls that we're going to announce this anyway, but I will let you know.
We are experiencing an actual disruption and our earnings will be down less than 1% for
the quarter, but it may get worse since the disruption looks like it will continue into next

177. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,726 (citing Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10
(1st Cir. 1990) and In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1989).
178. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,726 (citing Elkind Liggett & Myers, Inc. 635 F.2d 156,
166 (2d Cir. 1980) and In re Presstek, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 39,472 (Dec. 22, 1997)).
179. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
180. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (defining materiality requirement in a
Rule lOb-5 claim); 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2000) (establishing protocol for selective disclosure of material
information).
181. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
182. A court's finding of materiality in a SEC enforcement action, as a matter of law, may preclude a
company from raising the issue in a private Rule l0b-5 claim litigated in a different venue. See Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 325, 337 (1979) (collateral estoppel prevented issuer from relitigating
issues resolved against it in an SEC enforcement action).
183. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) (holding that scienter is required as an element of a
Rule lOb-5 civil enforcement action); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976) (stating that
the term scienter encompasses "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud"). But see
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000) (stating that in private claims involving
forward-looking statements, the plaintiff must prove that the statement was made with actual knowledge of its
falsity; recklessness will not suffice); STEINBERG, supra note 24, § 10.05(b) (discussing "bespeaks caution"
doctrine). Cf Marc I. Steinberg, The Proprietyand Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under the FederalSecurities
Laws, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 557 (1982) (discussing judicial approaches to the question of whether remedies
under the federal securities laws are cumulative or exclusive).
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quarter." Acme makes a public disclosure of the same information the following morning
right before the stock market opens for normal trading.
Assume that the SEC brings an enforcement action against Acme for violating
Regulation FD by failing to make a simultaneous public disclosure of the material
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188
private Rule lOb-5 antifraud claim.
To the extent antifraud claims such as this are litigated and reported, it will be
interesting to see what impact any subsequent public disclosure by the issuer will have on
Rule lOb-5 liability. Once the information becomes adequately and publicly disclosed,
for example, by issuing a press release or by the company's periodic SEC filings, the
window for an antifraud claim will close; the issuer cannot be said to be deceiving
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company's stock during that timeframe between the selective and public disclosures. In
the hypothetical above, the plaintiff would have to prove that she traded in Acme's stock
between the selective disclosure to Anna on Tuesday afternoon and the public
announcement on Wednesday morning. The lesson for issuers to be culled is that, even if
covered personnel make an intentional selective disclosure in violation of Regulation FD,
a subject issuer should make a subsequent public announcement as soon as practicable.

184. Given the Commission's concern about 24-hour trading (see supra note 128 and accompanying text) it
likely would be concerned about Anna's clients being able to trade on the information before the public
announcement.
185. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text (regarding the importance of qualitative factors in
assessing the materiality of quantitative statements).
186. For the purpose of this hypothetical, we assume that the private litigant files her lawsuit within the
proper statute of limitations. See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Pettigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 364
(1991) (stating that a suit under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 must be brought within one year of notice and
within three years of the alleged violation).
187. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 332 (permitting offensive use of collateral estoppel for issues
previously litigated in an SEC enforcement action).
188. See supra notes 143, 170 and accompanying text.
189. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977) (observing that "nondisclosure is
usually essential to the success of a manipulative scheme").
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V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Regulation FD represents a significant attempt by the Commission to restructure the
balance of power among investors active in the securities marketplace. It may fit
awkwardly in the existing securities framework, and that may lead to important
interpretive issues down the line. But, the Regulation does fill a gap in an issuer's
disclosure duties that had been left open by the federal securities laws and, at least in
some small regard, brings the U.S. laws in line with other established markets abroad. 190
For all that Regulation FD does and does not do in attempting to fill this gap, it
remains that the Regulation does not necessarily eliminate the informational disparity
between insiders and individuals. It does not, for example, cover all material nonpublic
information flowing out of an issuer, exempting information disclosed by non-senior
officials, offered in the daily business of the issuer, or provided subject to a
confidentiality agreement. 191 Market insiders still retain an advantage in having access to
this sort of information. 19 2 Analysts still will be better able to uncover and piece together
a mosaic of disparate bits of relevant information, and trade on it either for themselves or
for their clients. 193 In addition, even with information made publicly available in
compliance with Regulation FD, insiders have a structural advantage over individual
investors, advantages that stem from their position as professionals. Market professionals,
practically speaking, will generally learn information sooner, analyze it faster and better,
and act on it earlier than non-professionals. 194
Indeed, analysts incur much lower informational costs in obtaining news regarding a
company. They are compensated and recognized for their skill in ferreting out
information better and faster than anyone else. Furthermore, analysts play a crucial role
in ensuring the efficiency of capital markets by turning raw data into a more widely
accessible format. 19 5 Thus, even in the absence of selective disclosure, analysts will tend
to drive much of the trading in the marketplace, and many investors willingly follow their
lead. 196

190. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
191. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,718-19 (stating that section 2(A)(4) of the Release
discusses the Commission's efforts to narrow Regulation FD's scope).
192. See id. at 51,720 n.36 (discussing the analyst's job of ferreting out information through contact with
personnel that the Regulation does not cover).
193. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 n.17 (1983); see also Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at
51,722 ("[Aln issuer is not prohibited [by Regulation FD] from disclosing a non-material piece of information
to an analyst, even if, unbeknownst to the issuer, that piece helps the analyst complete a 'mosaic' of information
that, taken together, is material.").
194. See Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,717 (stating that even with the advent of online
trading, "analysts still provide value for investors by using their education, judgment, and expertise to analyze
information") (emphasis in original); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 59, at 569 (noting that unsophisticated
investors cannot make complete use of technical accounting data without analysts interpreting the information).
195. See, e.g., Serfaty v. Int'l Automated Sys., Inc., 180 F.R.D. 418, 422 (D. Utah 1998) ("Existence of
such reports would suggest that investment professionals reviewed the reports and made trading
recommendations to their investment clients based on the information in the reports."); Cammer v. Bloom, 711
F. Supp. 1264, 1286 (D.N.J. 1989) ("The existence of such [securities] analysts [following and reporting on a
company's stock] would imply, for example, the PMM reports were closely reviewed by investment
professionals, who would in turn make buy/sell recommendations to client investors.").
196. Cf.Regulation FD Release, supra note 1, at 51,717 ("Noting that analysts predominantly issue 'buy'
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The Hidden Issues of the SEC's Regulation FD

In this regard, Regulation FD in practical effect may be more symbolic than
functional. The Commission promulgated the Regulation to address the perception that
the markets' integrity was threatened. 197 The Regulation may improve this perception
without necessarily having an inordinately troublesome impact on issuer disclosure
practices. 198 But even if one assumes that the Regulation has a substantive impact in
limiting selective disclosure, the inquiry that the Commission will need to continually
address is whether the benefits of the new disclosure requirements outweigh their costs.
With the many issues still to be resolved under Regulation FD, this analysis will remain
subject to debate over the coming years.

recommendations on covered issuers.").
197. See id. at 51,716 ("We believe that the practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor
confidence in the integrity of our capital markets.").
198. See id. at 51,717. Some commentators to the proposed Regulation FD cited a February 2000 study,
conducted by the National Investor Relations Institute, for the proposition that many issuers already were
voluntarily opening their conference calls to individual investors. The Commission responded that these
practices have not fully stopped selective disclosure and that many issuers opened up their conference calls only
after the SEC started to focus its attention publicly on the issue of selective disclosure. See id.

